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ABSTRACT 
 
       The 1918-1919 Spanish influenza was the deadliest pandemic in history and citizens of Kansas 
City died in larger numbers due to politics. Kansas City government was under the control of two 
powerful political bosses, Democrats Tom Pendergast and Joe Shannon, who had an uneasy 
agreement to split the cities’ patronage jobs equally between them. This arrangement created a 
dysfunctional and unwieldy public health response to the pandemic which occurred at the end of 
1918. Since the public health response was so inadequate, quasi-governmental institutions tried to 
step into the vacuum. The Chamber of Commerce, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and 
the American Red Cross were much more influential and active in Kansas City than in most cities 
during the pandemic, and their leadership ensured that Kansas City would not be remembered in 
history as having the worst response in the country.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It all began quietly, muffled by the sounds of wartime activity, military censorship of the 
press, and the sleepiness of small town Kansas. John Barry, author of The Great Influenza, found 
mention of a “severe influenza” outbreak in Haskell, Kansas, the last week of February 1918.1 No 
major newspapers took note of this event, but the Santa Fe Monitor, a local Haskell newspaper, 
mentioned on 14 February that Dean Nilson had spent his five day furlough at home in Kansas, and 
then returned to Camp Funston.2 Additionally, on 28 February, “John Robert Bottom left yesterday 
for Camp Funston to serve his country,”3 and Ernest Elliot returned from Camp Funston after a visit 
with his brother. On 4 March, the hospital at Camp Funston, a mere three hundred miles from 
Haskell, had the first cases of influenza. Just three weeks later, Camp Funston’s hospital was caring 
for eleven hundred soldiers who had become ill with the virus.4
                                                          
1 John M. Barry, The Great Influenza : The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History (New York: Viking 
Penguin, 2005), 169. 
  Since this flu was at an Army camp, 
and massive numbers of troops were moving around the country to fight in World War I, the 
disease spread quickly throughout the country. Within two weeks, two Army camps in Georgia 
experienced the illness, and as spring marched on, at least twenty-four large Army camps had 
influenza outbreaks. In addition to the military victims, civilians who lived around the large military 
2 "Jean News," Santa Fe Monitor, 14 February 1918. 
3 "Local News," Santa Fe Monitor, 28 February 1918. 
4 Barry, 169. 
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camps also became infected by the influenza virus that spring. Of the fifty largest cities in the U.S., 
the thirty located near military camps noted a mortality rate higher than expected.5
Although this flu was extremely contagious, it did not seem particularly deadly in March of 
1918. At Camp Funston, the flu outbreak was followed by a pneumonia cluster; there were 48 
deaths from 233 cases; an average survival rate from pneumonia in 1918.
 
6 During the next few 
months, flu outbreaks were noted in France, Germany, England, and Spain. The majority of cases 
during this time were mild; of 10,313 sailors in the British fleet infected by the virus only four died.7 
The epidemic was well on its way to becoming a pandemic; India and China reported cases by May, 
Russia by June, and the Philippines by July.8
But even in this first wave in the spring, there were isolated clusters where the flu virus 
became deadly. In late May 1918, in an outbreak in France at a small military station where 1,018 
French soldiers were stationed; 688 required hospitalization, and 49 died.
  
9 Louisville, Kentucky was 
another cluster where the death rate was high, and even more unusual; 40 percent of the deaths 
occurred in the twenty to thirty-five age bracket.10
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Alfred W. Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic : The Influenza of 1918, 2nd ed. (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19. 
7 Barry, 173. 
8 Crosby, 28. 
9 Barry, 173. 
10 Ibid. 
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In agreement with Barry, historian Alfred Crosby argued that the second wave of influenza, 
the most deadly wave, began in earnest on three continents around the end of August 1918. Both 
authors pinpoint outbreaks in Boston, Massachusetts; Brest, France; and Freetown, Sierra Leone as 
the starting points.11 Within a few months, and one more wave, Spanish influenza12 killed more 
people than any other pandemic the world has experienced.13
 Kansas City did not escape the influenza pandemic. Public health officials began their 
response by denying there was a problem, and finished their response by simply waiting for the 
disease to run its course. Between those extremes there was political infighting, flouting of 
quarantines and bans by businesses and the public, lack of coordination with Kansas officials, and 
many needless citizen deaths.  
 
Kevin McShane published the only lengthy article on the 1918 influenza in Kansas City in 
1968. McShane examined the outbreak in Kansas City and attempted to explain the high death 
rate. His sources consisted of the Kansas City Times, Star, Post, and Journal, the Jackson County 
Medical Journal, some city reports, and personal interviews with several survivors. He concluded 
that it was caused by the refusal of many businesses, and most theaters, to comply with public 
health orders; by a political feud between two of the principals, Dr. A.J. Gannon and Mr. W. P. 
Motley; and by the Fifty-Fifty political arrangement between Tom Pendergast and Joe Shannon. I 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 182; Crosby, 37. 
12 Probably given this name since Spain was neutral in World War I and thus experienced no press censorship. 
13 Gina Bari Kolata, Flu : The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus That 
Caused It, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005; reprint, First Touchstone Edition, 2001), 285. 
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don’t disagree with those conclusions; I simply think those conclusions merely scratch the surface. 
The underlying reason for the high death rate was the boss political system in Kansas City. 
The focus of this thesis is not global but local; I discuss the impact of the three waves of 
influenza on Kansas City. I examine the public health measures, political considerations, and 
analyze the responses over time. I seek to answer the following questions: Did politicians and/or 
public health officers make changes as each wave hit the city? Was there a concerted effort to 
battle the flu or did the notoriously politicized nature of Kansas City government make this 
impossible? Were public health officials forced to assess the political effect of their actions before 
they acted? And did this create the endless delays, the political posturing, the lack of cooperation 
between the city departments, and ultimately, one of the highest excess death rates in the 
country?14
My examination will bring to life the greater Kansas City area as it was prior to the outbreak 
of Spanish influenza, thoroughly examine the actions of the relevant players during the pandemic, 
and speculate on the motivations of the major players. Personal stories of hardship and bravery 
during the pandemic will help to illustrate what happens to a city and a society when a crisis occurs. 
Ultimately, we shall see that pandemics, politics, and public health concerns should never be 
combined.  
 In this project I will argue that in Kansas City politics and public health were interwoven, 
which created and advanced a system that was barely tenable under normal circumstances, and 
truly dysfunctional in a time of crisis. 
                                                          
14 Martin C. J. Bootsma and Neil M. Ferguson, "The Effect of Public Health Measures on the 1918 Influenza 
Pandemic in U.S. Cities.[See Comment]," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 104, no. 18 (2007). 
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Global literature written on the flu outbreaks of 1918 is surprisingly scant given the 
magnitude of the event. Alfred Crosby’s book, America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918 
was published in 1989, and a second updated edition was published in 2003. Crosby focused on 
world events, and organized his book around the three waves of the flu. His extensive sources 
included military records, personal papers, newspapers, scientific articles, insurance company 
reports, government documents, and more. Furthermore, Crosby examined events in cities such as 
Philadelphia and San Francisco in depth, and dedicates a large section of his study to the outbreak 
in relation to World War I. Additionally, perhaps demonstrating the importance of the topic, he 
devoted an entire chapter, and part of the title, to the peculiarities of human memory, and why this 
event in history has been forgotten.15
Gina Kolata’s book Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search 
for the Virus that Caused It was published in 1999. She traced the first attempts to find out what 
caused influenza to the decoding of its DNA. Kolata’s book is not a study of the epidemic, but a 
study of the twists and turns taken in the process of discovering what caused the pandemic. The 
scope of Kolata’s research included many secondary sources; personal interviews some of the 
major participants in the drama, including Alfred Crosby, Johan Hultin, and Jeffrey Taubenberger, 
among others. To illustrate a common theme, in her prologue Kolata speculates as to why, as a 
 He suggested that the horror of the first global war simply 
overshadowed the pandemic. After all, global war was novel, and influenza, even as a pandemic 
was not.  
                                                          
15 Crosby, 311. 
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microbiology major in college, and then a medical writer for Science and The New York Times, she 
was not aware of the 1918 pandemic prior to her research on the book.16
Barry’s book The Great Influenza: the Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History was 
published in 2004, and accounts for the events, places, and people who played a role in the 
pandemic. Reviewers of his book have questioned some of the stories included in the volume; 
noting that the details differ significantly from what other accounts have presented, even while he 
painstakingly divides his sources into primary, secondary, and articles on the topic. At the heart of 
Barry’s argument is that World War I and this influenza were intimately connected; the quick 
spread of the virus across the world was due to mobile troops, the lack of nurses to care for the sick 
due to mobilization, and the public health decisions that were heavily influenced by military 
necessity. Barry, too, offered an explanation for the dearth of records which remain on the flu; he 
suggests participants were more occupied with saving lives than keeping records.
  
17
There are several other published works on the Spanish flu, but for the most part Alfred 
Crosby correctly named it America’s Forgotten Pandemic.
  
18
                                                          
16 Kolata, ix. 
 Truthfully, however, it was only 
forgotten by the public. Scientists continued to study the event, and Jeffrey Taubenberger and Ann 
Reid have recently managed to recreate the RNA of the virus with the goal of discovering why it 
17 Barry, 463. 
18 Richard Collier, The Plague of the Spanish Lady : The Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919, 1st American ed. 
(New York: Atheneum, 1974); E. June Osborn and others, History, Science, and Politics : Influenza in America, 
1918-1976 (New York: Prodist, 1977); H. Phillips, David Killingray, and NetLibrary Inc., "The Spanish Influenza 
Pandemic of 1918-19 New Perspectives," (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003). 
http://ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/login?url=http://www.netLibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=1&booki
d=97571. 
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was so deadly.19 Researchers across the world are closely monitoring outbreaks of avian and swine 
influenza in the hopes of preventing the next pandemic. Other public health researchers are 
studying the nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPI’s) employed by doctors at the time and 
assessing the effectiveness of those measures.20
What is clear is that the number of sources for information on this period in Kansas City is 
somewhat limited. The two local daily newspapers, the Kansas City Journal and the morning and 
evening editions of the Kansas City Star, provided a wealth of information on the daily events. The 
Western Historical Manuscripts Collection on the campus of the University of Missouri-Kansas City 
retains the records of the Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, and this organization was quite 
influential in the pandemic. The Missouri Valley Archives of the Kansas City Public Library has the 
1918-1919 Annual Report of the Hospital and Health Board, the only comprehensive city record 
remaining of the influenza pandemic. The Clendening History of Medicine Library at the University 
of Kansas has the records of the Visiting Nurses Association for the time period. Books written 
about Kansas City, Tom Pendergast, and the Kansas City Star frequently explained an item in the 
newspaper that was not clear, and were valuable for background information. Several newspapers 
from the time period in question, September 1918 to March 1919, such as the Kansas City Sun, the 
Kansas City Weekly Journal, the Kansas City Globe, the Press, the Kansas City Advocate, the 
Argentine Republic, the Missouri Valley Farmer, and the Santa Fe Monitor, were reviewed at the 
Kansas State Historical Society, and proved invaluable. Additionally, I reviewed September 1918 to 
  
                                                          
19 J. K. Taubenberger, A. H. Reid, and T. G. Fanning, "The 1918 Influenza Virus: A Killer Comes into View," 
Virology 274, no. 2 (2000): 241-5. 
20 Bootsma and Ferguson: 7588-93. 
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March 1919 for the following newspapers at the Kansas City Public Library; the Kansas City Kansan, 
the Daily Record, and El Cosmopolita.  
I contacted the following local Kansas City archives for information; the Mid-America Black 
Archives, American Jazz Museum, Negro Leagues Baseball Museum, Bruce R. Watkins Cultural 
Center, Swope Parkway HealthCare, the National World War I Museum, and the Urban League. The 
Kansas City Athenaeum searched their archives for me, as well as the Catholic Diocese of Kansas 
City. Sister Jane Behlmann, CSJ, of the Sisters of St. Joseph of Carondolet searched their archives 
and found no mention of any local influenza work of the Sisters during this period. St. Joseph’s 
Medical Center provided one anecdote about the nurses from the period, and St. Luke’s Medical 
Center has no archives. The archives of St. Mary’s Hospital in Kansas City were researched by Sister 
MaryLu Stueber, FSM, of the Franciscan Sisters of Mary, and relevant material was sent by fax. I 
was unable to gain access to the archive of Truman Medical Center (formerly General Hospital), but 
I was assured that no records remain from the time period. I spoke to Dr. Gerald Hoff of the Kansas 
City Department of Public Health and he supplied me with the only remaining public health records 
from the period; a small collection of newspaper articles. The Kansas City Parks Department 
maintains an archive, but they have no records relating to anything but the Parks system.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PROGRESSIVE KANSAS CITY 
The 1910 census of Kansas City showed a population of 248,381, which increased to 
324,410 by 1920. It was growing rapidly, changing from a frontier town with no paved roads, to a 
city with paved boulevards and a growing sense of civic responsibility and pride. By 1914, parts of 
Kansas City were enjoying the results of the City Beautiful movement, which began in the 1890s 
and attempted to use urban planning and beautification as a method of achieving social 
improvement. In Kansas City, the movement resulted in miles of graceful trafficways and expansive 
parks throughout parts of the city. But as the years passed, it became clear to social reformers that 
the social ills of poverty, crime, and squalor still remained. The solution in Kansas City was a public 
Welfare Board. In April 1910 progressive Kansas City politicians created “…the first full public 
department of welfare in the United States.”1
                                                          
1 Henry C. Haskell and Richard B. Fowler, City of the Future; a Narrative History of Kansas City, 1850-1950 
(Kansas City, Mo.,: F. Glenn Pub. Co., 1950), 111. 
 The goal was to remove politics from the department 
of welfare and the progressives felt the best way to do that was to appoint a citizen board that 
would serve without compensation. William Volker, a wealthy Kansas City businessman; Jacob 
Billikopf, a superintendent of United Jewish Charities; LeRoy Halbert, a social worker; and Frank P. 
Walsh, a lawyer and local Democratic player; met to create visionary goals for Kansas City and for 
public welfare. The board “combined a traditional emphasis on self-help with a forward-looking 
commitment to activist government.…the welfare board provided a minimum of direct financial aid 
10 
 
and concentrated on offering access to loans, jobs, housing and free legal and financial advice.”2
The 1910 census showed over 80 percent of the citizens were native-born whites. Blacks 
accounted for about 10 percent, and the other 10 percent were foreign-born, including Germans, 
Russians, Italians, Swedes, English, Greeks, Irish, and Mexicans, among others. In fact, there were 
enough Germans and Mexicans to support two foreign language newspapers; the Kansas City 
Presse in German, and in Kansas City, Kansas, El Cosmopolita in Spanish.  
 By 
June 1912, the Welfare Board issued a housing report, and just one year later published the “Social 
Prospectus of Kansas City, MO.” These two documents offer a glimpse at life in Kansas City during 
the second decade of the twentieth century. 
The city was divided into distinct areas, mostly around geography. Quality Hill was a 
housing area on the top of a hill with homes for Kansas City’s most prosperous. However, by 1914 it 
was one of the first neighborhoods to experience the suburban exodus, as people of wealth moved 
farther away from the business part of the city, seeking fresh air and uncrowded vistas. As the 
wealthy moved out, the larger houses were divided into rooming houses. The Welfare Board called 
the West Side district, which included Quality Hill, “the Rooming House Evil,”3
                                                          
2 Harry Haskell, Boss-Busters and Sin Hounds : Kansas City and Its Star (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
2007), 106. 
and described “411 
rooming houses, many, in fact nearly all, of which are boarding houses as well as rooming houses. 
3 Kansas City (Mo.). Board of Public Welfare., Report on Housing Conditions in Kansas City, Missouri, Showing 
Defects in Present Laws and Suggesting Form of Code Needed ([Kansas City,: Fratcher ptg. co., 1912), 28. 
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The rooms total 2,880, housing 3,557 lodgers.”4
 
 They describe inadequate parlors for women to 
receive male visitors, both sexes sharing toilet facilities, and general overcrowding.  
The North Side area of the city was also home to many lodging houses; there were forty-
eight lodging houses with a capacity for 3,282 men.5
                                                          
4 Ibid., 30. 
 Transient workers were the most typical 
Figure 1-1912 Kansas City. Courtesy of Welfare Board, Kansas City, MO 
12 
 
lodgers, with the majority working for the railroad. Due to a severe lack of bathing facilities in the 
lodging houses, a private charity, the Helping Hand Institute, offered twenty-four showers. There 
were no public baths in the North Side district. The North Side was also home to many Italian 
immigrants, giving it the name “Little Italy.”  
The Northwest area included all the West Bottoms and Union Depot. Many of the Greek 
immigrants lived in the Northwest area. It was heavily industrial; having only one church and one 
public school. The area had a variety of small shops, pawn shops, and saloons, and “most of the 
dwellings and lodging houses of the district are located over these shops and stores, which occupy 
the first floor.”6
The West Side district was quite hilly, and perhaps due to this fact of geography, had few 
paved streets and little access to water. But the area boasted eighteen churches, a large population 
of Swedish immigrants, and the Mattie Rhodes Memorial Society Nursery. This nursery provided 
working mothers a safe place for children ages two to twelve to stay during the day. It had a sewing 
school, a library, and each summer St. Luke’s Hospital opened a camp and clinic.
  
7
The Swope Settlement District was an area of contrasts. The infamous McClure Flats were 
located in this area, as well as the downtown shopping districts. It was not an area of homeowners; 
most residents lived in tenements. The housing survey showed “10 percent residences, 16 percent 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
5 Ibid., 43. 
6 Kansas City (Mo.). Board of Public Welfare., Social Prospectus of Kansas City, Missouri (Kansas City, Mo.: 
1913), 33. 
7 Ibid., 62. 
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combinations, 35 percent tenements, and at least 70 percent lodging houses.”8 Racially, the area 
housed about 10 percent of the black population of the city.9
During the early part of the twentieth century, most of the United States was segregated, 
and Kansas City was not an exception. Blacks were restricted to living in three main areas of town; 
Hicks Hollow, Belvedere, and the Bowery, and the City Beautiful movement excluded those parts of 
town. Hicks Hollow and Belvedere were located near Independence Avenue, and “nearly 8,000 of 
the city’s 23,566 African-Americans lived in the Bowery, between Troost and Woodland Avenues 
from Seventeenth to Twenty-fifth Streets.
 
10 The streets were unpaved; there was little sanitation, 
and little chance that residents could do much about it without help. A local branch of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was organized, and by 1915 was 
active in Kansas City. There was a great need for their activism, as “the per capita wealth of black 
residents was $80.61, compared with the $667.96 for whites.”11
                                                          
8 Ibid., 74. 
 With little public access to water 
and sewer the city was forced to build public bathhouses to supply basic bathing needs. White 
citizens refused to allow blacks in the bathhouses, so the NAACP assisted black citizens in building 
their own bathhouses. They also had their own amusement park; “Lincoln Electric Park at 
9 Ibid., 69. 
10 Rick Montgomery and Shirl Kasper, Kansas City : An American Story (Kansas City, Mo.: Kansas City Star 
Books, 1999), 174. 
11 Ibid., 166. 
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Woodland and Twentieth Street, with its Ferris wheel and ‘jumping horse Merry-Go-Round.’”12
Figure 2-1912 Geographic Distribution. Courtesy of Welfare Board, Kansas City, MO  
 
 
 
Black areas in Kansas City were not the only ones that the City Beautiful movement had 
ignored. Kansas City also claimed an infamous slum just two blocks south of the business district 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 177. 
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called McClure Flats. This area consisted of one story tenements with dirt outdoor privies, no 
running water, and housing in a state of decay. Inspectors for the city found “94 families, composed 
of 263 individuals, occupying 138 rooms.”13 William Rockhill Nelson built the new headquarters of 
the Kansas City Star just on the edge of the area, and from 1890 forward he assigned editor William 
Allen White to the task of getting it demolished.14 Between political corruption, politically powerful 
owners, and a lack of political will, it would remain standing for almost thirty years, and was finally 
razed in March 1919, after Dr. E.H. Bullock, health director, declared it “unfit for human 
habitation,”15
By 1914, workers were organizing, mostly in the labor unions. The Industrial Workers of the 
World, often known as the “Wobblies,” demonstrated for the abolition of the “wage-slave system” 
in Kansas City.
 after the influenza pandemic. 
16
                                                          
13 Kansas City (Mo.). Board of Public Welfare., Report on Housing Conditions in Kansas City, Missouri, Showing 
Defects in Present Laws and Suggesting Form of Code Needed, 39. 
 Many were arrested and sent out to the Municipal Farm to work out their 
sentences breaking rocks. Kansas City had a great variety of jobs, partly due to its favorable location 
in the middle of the country, with easy access to rail and rivers. Livestock was concentrated in the 
West Bottoms, wholesaling, railroads and shipping around the beautiful new Union Station, and 
manufacturing plants, including automobiles, throughout the city. The three largest divisions of the 
manufacturing industry were printing and publishing, with 179 establishments; bread and bakeries, 
14 Haskell, Boss-Busters and Sin Hounds : Kansas City and Its Star, 107. 
15 "Must Vacate Mcclure Flats," Kansas City Star, 27 November 1918. 
16 Montgomery and Kasper, 169. 
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with 107 establishments; and copper, tin and sheet iron production with 59 establishments.17 
Women, especially black women and girls, could be found working in steam laundries for $4.50 a 
week. In the summer, the temperatures in the ironing rooms could reach over 120 degrees.18
If health care was needed, Kansas City had a variety of facilities and personnel available. 
General Hospital, sometimes called City Hospital, was the only public hospital, with a bed capacity 
of 350. However the hospital only accepted whites. Blacks had General Hospital #2, also known as 
the Colored Hospital, which was established in 1908 when the white patients moved to a new 
building across the street. By 1914, management of the hospital was in the hands of black 
physicians; Drs. T.C. Unthank, J.E. Perry, W.J. Thompkins, and J.E. Dibble,
 
19
The birth of Wheatley-Provident Hospital was unique for the times. Black physician John 
Edward Perry established the sixteen room Perry Sanitarium in 1910 in his own house at 1214 Vine 
Street. In addition to the hospital he ran a nursing school for blacks. Changes in the state law in 
1914 forced hospitals with nursing schools to have a board of directors as the administrators. There 
were two black charities that wanted the Sanitarium to meet the state requirements, the Provident 
Association and the Phyllis Wheatley Association. Unfortunately, the two charities couldn’t agree 
 but it would be many 
years before the hospital would be properly supplied with operating funds and equipment from the 
city. In Kansas City, Kansas, black patients who could afford to pay had access to Douglass Hospital 
and in Kansas City, Missouri there was Wheatley-Provident Hospital.  
                                                          
17 Kansas City (Mo.). Board of Public Welfare., Social Prospectus of Kansas City, Missouri, 14. 
18 Montgomery and Kasper, 169. 
19 Jackson County Medical Society (Mo.), Kansas City General and Allied Hospitals, 3 vols. (Kansas City, Mo.: 
Jackson County Medical Society, 1932), vol. XXVI, no. 41, 7. 
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on who should take over the Sanitarium. The Provident Association would take over the Sanitarium 
and rename it Provident Hospital, but at the urging of Colored Charities and the Welfare 
Department of Kansas City, the two charities merged and the hospital was renamed Wheatley-
Provident Hospital.20
The Leeds Tuberculosis Hospital had an unknown number of beds, probably from forty to 
sixty,
  
21 and there was a small isolation hospital at Twenty-third and Cherry. The Leeds Hospital was 
used for smallpox patients, women with venereal diseases, and tuberculosis patients at different 
times in 1918. In August of 1918 it returned to full time use as a tuberculosis sanitarium.22 Some of 
the private hospitals in town were Mercy Hospital, German Hospital (became Research Hospital 
that year), St Joseph’s Hospital, St. Mary’s Hospital, St. Luke’s Hospital, and Trinity Lutheran 
Hospital.23
By 4 March 1918 the active membership of the Jackson County Medical Society was 360 
doctors.
   
24 The Visiting Nurses Association had fourteen registered nurses employed in 1918.25
                                                          
20 Barbara M. Gorman, Richard D. McKinzie, and Theodore A. Wilson, From Shamans to Specialists : A History 
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21 Kansas City Missouri Hospital and Health Board, Annual Report of the Hospital and Health Board1918-1919, 
22. 
22 "To Reopen Leeds Sanitarium," Kansas City Star, 7 August 1918. 
23 For a complete list of the hospitals in town that would treat whites, see appendix h. 
24 Jackson County Medical Society (Mo.), "Membership List," Weekly Bulletin of the Jackson County Medical 
Society 17, no. 12 (1918): 91. 
25 J. E. Logan, "Visiting Nurses for Pay Patients," Weekly Bulletin of the Jackson County Medical Society 12, no. 
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Superintendent of Nursing at General Hospital, Mary C. Tucker, listed seven supervising nurses, and 
reported that “the nurses in training number between 85 and 100 and among them the work of 
nursing in the Hospital is divided according to their seniority in training.”26
Historians disagree on the date that Kansas City first installed a Health Board. One resource 
offers a date of 1908,
  
27 but another offers this explanation, “the May 8, 1878 common council 
passed an ordinance creating the Board of Health, to be composed of six persons-one from each 
ward-appointed by the mayor with council approval, to serve one year without pay.”28 In 
succeeding years the council added as members the Chief of Police, Chief of Fire Department, and 
the Mayor.29
The Jackson County Medical Society regrets the recent forced resignation of the health and 
hospital board and the health director and the hospital manager. These gentlemen 
 The Annual Report of the Hospital and Health Board of 1919 listed W.P. Motley as the 
President of the Board, and B.L. Hart as the Vice-President. Dr. E.H. Bullock is listed as the Health 
Director and the Head of General Hospital, the only public city hospital. The Mayor was not listed as 
a member, and neither were the Police and Fire Chiefs, so at some point the composition of the 
Board had changed. The one thing that did not change was the patronage. Every member of the 
Board owed allegiance to one of the Democratic bosses. In fact, the Jackson County Medical Society 
passed a resolution on 29 January 1918 concerning the health situation: 
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possessed all the personal qualifications and technical training necessary to render Kansas 
City the best service in its most important department. The society desires to express to 
them its highest appreciation of their ideals and labors and condemns the provincialism, 
selfishness and malice of the political rulers which made their resignations necessary….30
The newly appointed health board started the year dealing with a smallpox outbreak, and finished 
it dealing with an influenza pandemic. 
 
 
Citizens had access to a great variety of entertainment and social activities in Kansas City. 
Movies were especially popular; there were eighty-one movie theaters, which hosted almost twice 
the city’s population each week.31 Kansas City had bowling alleys, skating rinks, dance halls, 
amusement parks, and the city park system for respectable entertainment, and bawdyhouses, 
saloons, pool halls, and prostitution for other clientele. Churches boasted 84,393 members; 
however, that was only 34 percent of the population.32 Kansas City maintained seventy-six public 
grade schools and four high schools; thirty-four Catholic schools, including three orphan asylum 
schools with a population of 350; and twenty-eight other types of schools. It offered a public library 
system composed of the Central Library, “five branch libraries, twenty-six sub-stations, and five 
school-room stations.”33
Clubs were another important means of socializing, and Kansas City women had fifty 
different clubs from which to choose, while the men of the city had to settle for thirty-two. The 
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biggest men’s club was the Industrial Council, with a membership of 15,000.34
Boss Politics 
 The Board of Public 
Welfare offered thirty-one social centers across the city for use by clubs, the Board of Education, 
neighborhood improvement associations, and other individuals. Kansas Citians in 1914 could 
justifiably call their city progressive, but the political landscape was all about boss politics. 
 
A political machine is “in U.S. politics, a party organization, headed by a single boss or small 
autocratic group, that commands enough votes to maintain political and administrative control of a 
city, county, or state.”35
Since the 1880s, the Pendergast name had been powerful in local politics. Jim Pendergast 
was a saloon owner who believed in the power of friendship and loyalty. He used his friendships 
and charity to encourage voters to support his candidates. When he was asked about his Boss 
designation he replied: 
 The United States has a history of political machines in large cities; William 
Tweed in New York City, James Curley in Boston, and Richard Daley in Chicago, just to name a few. 
Most historians attribute the rise of the political machines to the rapid growth that was 
experienced by cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. City governments were 
unable to cope with the rapid growth, and so services lagged behind. The political machine stepped 
in to fill in the void. The machine was a structured organization with a Boss, his ward leaders, and 
his loyal followers.  
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I’ve been called a boss. All there is to it is having friends, doing things for people, and then 
later on they’ll do things for you….You can’t coerce people into doing things for you-you 
can’t make them vote for you. I never coerced anybody in my life. Wherever you see a man 
bulldozing anybody he don’t last long.36
Jim Pendergast started out by gaining control of the First Ward, an area of Kansas City that 
was mostly comprised of the West Bottoms. This was an industrial area where packing plants, rail 
yards, machine shops and factories were located. Most residents were Irish, German, or black 
working men, and they lived in some of the worst housing and sanitation conditions in the city.
 
 
37
 The North End, or “Little Italy,” was a very similar neighborhood to the West Bottoms. 
Many laborers lived there in tenement housing; it was the center of the large Italian community; 
and it had Kansas City’s “red light” district.
 
These laborers were the friends that Pendergast would use to expand his control of Kansas City 
politics. By 1892 he gained control of the First Ward, and began to expand his strength into the 
North End. 
38
                                                          
36 Lyle W. Dorsett, The Pendergast Machine, Urban Life in America Series. (New York,: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), 26. 
 The working men in these two areas saw Pendergast 
as their supporter. He brought a park to the West Bottoms, stopped a pay cut for city fireman, and 
blocked a plan to move the only fire station out of the area. He could be found posting bond for 
gamblers, and keeping his saloon well supplied with cash in order to cash checks for the working 
men.  
37 Ibid., 4. 
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 By 1900, Pendergast assisted his friend, James A. Reed, to become mayor. That meant that 
a large number of city patronage jobs were under Pendergast’s control. He named the deputy 
license inspector for Kansas City, he controlled the street and fire department jobs, and he named 
“123 out of the 173 patrolmen” on the police force.39
 But Pendergast would make a decision in the fall of 1900 that would lessen some of the 
control he had over city politics. Joseph B. Shannon, another Democratic boss, had control of a 
number of areas in the county, and he had a large number of jobs in the county courthouse under 
his control.
 All of this control was good for Pendergast’s 
business interests too, since gambling in his saloons was very popular. Since few police were willing 
to interfere in Jim’s business, gambling could go on uninterrupted.  
40
                                                          
39 Ibid., 32. 
 At the fall Democratic Convention Joe Shannon packed the committee and refused to 
allow Pendergast’s men to be seated. Pendergast walked out and, after some legal skirmishes, and 
attempts by the state Democratic Party to reunite the two men failed, Pendergast had his men sit 
out the election. Without all the Democratic votes from the city under Jim Pendergast’s control, 
Shannon’s candidates were easily defeated by the Republicans. Both men were canny enough 
politicians to realize that a compromise was needed, and the Fifty-Fifty compromise was born. 
Pendergast and Shannon agreed to split the patronage jobs in half, and support each other’s 
candidates. This arrangement would last on into Tom Pendergast’s reign and only be abandoned 
around 1925, after Tom Pendergast gained sole control of the organization. Jim Pendergast would 
retire from politics in 1910, but his brother Tom had been groomed to take over the machine. 
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Tom Pendergast moved beyond friendships to large scale favor granting as a way to win 
elections. Like his brother, his main rival was not the Republicans, but fellow Democrat, Joe 
Shannon.41 The Fifty-Fifty compromise broke down in the 1916 mayoral election. The rivals would 
both place candidates on the primary ballot, but when Shannon’s candidate won, Tom Pendergast 
refused to support the winner. This split of the Democratic vote allowed the Republican candidate, 
George Edwards to win.42 Edwards only served only one term, and once again Pendergast and 
Shannon worked together to elect Democratic Party man James Cowgill as Mayor. Shannon and his 
supporters, known as the Rabbits, and Pendergast and his supporters, known as the Goats, 
continued to bicker over patronage jobs for the next few years, but eventually Pendergast 
prevailed.43 The progressive Public Welfare Board that had been carefully set up to get welfare out 
of politics was not in the interest of the Democratic machine. Pendergast wanted to be the one 
who handed out the charity and the jobs; by 1918 the Welfare Board was under the control of Tom 
Pendergast.44
Tom Pendergast continued to expand the Pendergast business interests and political 
power. The family business interests started with a saloon, and then branched off into gambling, 
hotels, and liquor distribution. But the Pendergast brothers foresaw the rise of Prohibition, and 
moved out of the liquor business into the Eureka Petroleum Company and the business of selling 
  
                                                          
41 Ibid., 33. 
42 Lawrence Harold Larsen, Nancy J. Hulston, and University of Missouri Press., Pendergast!, Missouri 
Biography Series. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 57. 
43 Dorsett, 67. 
44 Haskell, Boss-Busters and Sin Hounds : Kansas City and Its Star, 173. 
24 
 
concrete.45
To sum up the situation in 1918, Kansas City had a Democrat for Mayor, who owed his 
election to the Democratic bosses, and these bosses, Shannon and Pendergast, divided up the city 
departments with their supporters. The owner of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, 
Bernard A. Corrigan, was a local Democrat who gained the franchise from these bosses. The Police 
Department, Fire Department, City Council, and every office of city government are controlled by 
Shannon and Pendergast. Not surprisingly, when the flu reached Kansas City, this heavily 
politicized, unstable government would create enormous roadblocks to an effective response. 
 Selling concrete would become his most profitable enterprise, and he would continue 
that business until his conviction in 1939 for income tax evasion.  
 
Medicine, 1918 
When it came to medical care, Kansas City was in the same predicament as the rest of the 
world. In 1918 doctors had very little in the way of treatment for Spanish influenza. The most 
effective treatment was to provide good nursing care. Scientists were not certain about what 
actually caused influenza, and as a result, treatments varied from the desperate to the practical. 
Medical training itself was at a crossroads; moving from an apprenticeship model of learning, to a 
scientific, academic learning model. These factors and others influenced the response to what 
would turn out to be the worst pandemic in history. Through understanding how doctors were 
trained to treat diseases and the state of scientific knowledge of influenza, responses to the 
pandemic in Kansas City that may appear absurd become more understandable. 
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 First, let’s examine the state of medical training. In the 1870s most American medical 
schools accepted anyone who could pay and the faculty was the owners of the school. The faculty 
got paid directly from student fees. Medical schools did not allow students to treat patients, and 
the usual term of study was two four-month lecture series.46
 In 1873 a visionary man, Johns Hopkins, died and left an enormous trust with the purpose 
of founding a university and a hospital. The trustees, who were Quakers, intended to model 
German universities, which at that time were among the most respected institutions of scientific 
learning. The first president of the university was Daniel Coit Gilman, and he sought to make Johns 
Hopkins the most respected and rigorous institution of learning in the United States. The University 
opened in 1876, and the medical school in 1893. The graduates of Johns Hopkins would go on to 
become faculty at many other medical schools around the country, and thus medical education as 
we now know began at Johns Hopkins. 
 No college degree was required to 
enter medical school. Universities were not associated with these medical schools, and there was 
no exam given before a person could call himself, or rarely, herself, Doctor. 
 There were several theories of illness at the turn of the century. The oldest perhaps was 
miasmas. This theory proposed that disease was caused by either bad air, fumes in the air, or the 
climate. Then there was the filth theory which attributed most diseases to dirty living conditions. 
The newest theory was the germ theory, which stated that disease was caused by small living 
organisms, and that different organisms caused different diseases. It was in competition with the 
chemical theory of disease, which held that chemicals called “zymes” started a reaction in the body 
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that made people sick.47
 When the Spanish influenza struck, doctors were astonished by the condition of their 
patients. William Henry Welch, the man who founded the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and 
Public Heath, offered that “this must be some new kind of infection or plague,”
 It would be fair to say that in 1918, there were practicing doctors in almost 
every town who were firm adherents of each theory. And while the germ theory would eventually 
win out, it was not that clear cut to practitioners in 1918. 
48
These men start with what appears to be an ordinary attack of LaGrippe or Influenza, and 
when brought to Hosp. they very rapidly develop the most vicious type of Pneumonia that 
has ever been seen. Two hours after admission they have the Mahogany spots over the 
cheek bones, and a few hours later you can begin to see the Cyanosis extending from their 
ears and spreading all over the face, until it is hard to distinguish the coloured men from 
the white.
 after he saw the 
first patients. They had never seen a disease like this before. In fact, this disease was so unlike the 
influenza they were accustomed to seeing, that many patients were be diagnosed with something 
else. Typhoid, cholera, bubonic plague, dengue or yellow fever were some of the diagnoses, but 
slowly most physicians came to realize that it was simply the most virulent influenza they had ever 
seen. Patients experienced high fevers, a wet cough that brought up blood, and turned blue. Dr. 
Roy Grist, an Army physician wrote: 
49
Death occurred within twenty-four to forty-eight hours in healthy young men in the prime of life. 
And that was the other unusual thing about this illness; deaths were less among the very young and 
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the very old, the usual victims of influenza. This influenza killed the people who seemingly were the 
best equipped to fight it.  
Treatments proposed by the medical practitioners of the day varied widely and mostly 
depended on the doctor. Due to the war, many towns were left with only elderly doctors as it was 
very patriotic to enlist in the service. And as is true today, it is mostly the young who are innovative 
and eager for change. So the young, innovative doctors, the ones who were most likely to have had 
an academic, scientific education, were mostly serving in the Army. Therefore, the Army was as 
prepared as any group could have been to fight the epidemic. The Army Medical Corps was well 
aware of the havoc that an outbreak of pneumonia could cause among the troops. As early as June 
1918, well before the second wave of influenza began, Joe Capps, the Chief of Service at the 
hospital at Camp Grant in Illinois, began testing a pneumonia serum prepared from chickens.50 He 
also tested having patients with respiratory diseases wear a gauze mask designed by him, and his 
paper reporting the positive results of that study was published in the 10 August 1918 issue of the 
Journal of the American Medical Association.51 When Camp Grant began to experience the second 
deadly wave of influenza, Capp tried to put into practice what he knew had worked. He tried to 
have the patients wear masks, but six days into the epidemic, with 4,102 patients in his hospital, he 
had to give up on the masks; there was not enough “material or personnel to make them.”52
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“very carefully controlled”53 experiments with the chicken pneumonia serum and its planned 
administration changed to simply giving the serum until it ran out. It did seem to work; “two 
hundred and thirty-four men suffering from pneumonia received the serum, only 16.7 percent died, 
while more than half of those who did not receive it died.”54
 Civilian doctors also experimented with quarantines, vaccines, and masks with little 
success. Public health officials in many places did not have the authority to impose quarantines, 
and even when quarantines were imposed there were many holes in them. For example, most 
cities exempted any war-related activities, so Red Cross meetings continued, Liberty Loan noon 
lunches and parades went on, and war-related businesses remained open. With all these 
exceptions, quarantines were not very effective. The Surgeon General of the United States Public 
Health Department, Dr. Rupert Blue, issued pamphlets around the country instructing patients on 
how to tell the flu from an ordinary cold, advising on what to do when a person got sick, and 
explaining how the disease was spread (he was an adherent of the germ theory). Blue also 
discouraged patients from taking any patent medicine cures writing, “It is foolish to ask the druggist 
 Other preventative attempts in the 
Army were iodine in glycerine mouthwashes and Vaseline with menthol in the nose. Those two 
attempts addressed both the miasmatic and germ theories of disease. But it was in the Army that 
the most effective prevention could be ordered, and that was quarantine. Quarantine was one of 
the best public health measures, and most Army doctors were aware that a twenty-one day period 
was the ideal.  
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to prescribe and may be dangerous to take the so called ‘safe, sure and harmless’ remedies 
advertised by patent medicine manufacturers.”55
The Kansas City Star published recommendations for prevention from the city’s infectious 
disease expert, Dr. A.J. Gannon. His advice was to stay out of crowds, avoid dust, keep the bowels 
active with laxatives and the kidneys active with plenty of water, and to spray the nose and throat 
with diluted Listerine or salt water.
 However, a desperate populace, and some of the 
desperate doctors who really had nothing to offer, often ignored this sound advice. 
56 Although the Health Department in Chicago allowed a Liberty 
Loan Parade to march, it “instructed all the marchers to go home right afterwards, remove all 
clothing, rub the body dry, take a laxative, and you will minimize your chances of catching the 
disease.”57 Alcohol was a popular preventative, as were onions and garlic, both eaten and worn-a 
remedy that dated back to ancient Egypt. Non smokers took up smoking and eating yeast and soda 
were proposed to prevent the flu.58
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 The latter was part of the chemical or zyme theory of disease. 
The item that got the most publicity, and the most backing, from the medical establishment was 
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did prevent some cases simply by decreasing the amount of particles that were spread when an 
infected patient coughed or sneezed. 
Once an individual became sick only good nursing care could help. Keeping warm, drinking 
sufficient fluids, and lowering temperatures were the sum of the care available. The records of the 
Visiting Nurses Association offered a glimpse into the effectiveness of good nursing care. They 
“made 4,392 visits to 1,254 influenza patients alone, with a record of only 35 deaths among that 
number.”59 Doctors and their patients could buy over-the-counter aspirin for fevers, atropine and 
digitalis for the heart, but that was about all the medication that was available. Alfred Stengel, an 
infectious diseases expert in Philadelphia, lectured students at the University of Pennsylvania 
before they went out to the hospitals. He had reviewed medical journals for any ideas to treat 
influenza and tested dozens of them. “But Stengel’s message was simple: This doesn’t work, that 
doesn’t work. Nothing worked.”60
This was the situation in the fall of 1918. Doctors were not sure what to call this illness, 
there was widespread disagreement on the correct treatment, and they were just making educated 
guesses on how to control it. Locally, the political boss system was in control of all city politics, and 
there was a turf war occurring between two bosses. Another political complication stemmed from 
geography; there were two Kansas City’s. There was the Missouri side and the Kansas side. The 
town was divided by a state line politically, but on the ground there was no clear division. No 
natural physical landmark like a river or a mountain separated the two towns, but public health 
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responses were vastly different in the two cities. Additionally, on the Missouri side, public health 
officials were new on the job, and had the stigma of being political appointees. 
Influenza Begins 
There were only seven articles related to the 1918 spring outbreak of the flu published in 
the Kansas City Star; five of those were advertisements. Of the news articles, one detailed the 
outbreak of the flu at Army camps from inductees entering the camp already ill, and mentioned 
that rates of illness were going up.61 The other article, published 3 April 1918, clearly describes the 
unknown nature of the disease. The title was “Rain Ends Queer Epidemic” and it opined that “Local 
physicians feel certain that it is a peculiar form of influenza.”62 Over 300 schoolchildren were 
affected, and two forms of attack, sudden and slow, are mentioned. The illness in either form 
seemed to last about 48 hours, and tiredness was the main complaint.63
Things changed with the second wave, however. On 26 September 1918, the Kansas City 
Star published a general article giving the signs and symptoms, possible treatments, and preventive 
measures for Spanish Influenza. The first two cases were reported in Kansas City on 27 September 
 It had broken out in 
Mexico, Missouri, but there was no mention of a similar “queer epidemic” closer to Kansas City. 
Apparently all the children recovered; there was no further mention of the illness. It seemed that 
Missourians made as little of the spring wave of the Spanish flu as did the rest of the world. 
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1918.64 Mrs. Mary Riley, an inspector at the Hotel Muehlebach, was admitted to General Hospital in 
isolation on Sunday, 29 September.65 By 30 September five cases had been reported. Three cases 
occurred among the staff, a cook and two waitresses, at Fred Harvey’s restaurant in Union Station, 
on 2 October.66
Having so many of the first cases occur among workers whose jobs exposed them to great 
numbers of people was not a good sign for Kansas City. Additionally, there were three other public 
places with outbreaks noted; the Burlington roundhouse had four cases, the Girls Hotel on 
Jefferson Street had two cases, and there were two cases at the Y.M.C. A. at Tenth and Oak.
  
67 The 
chief of the contagious disease division, Dr. A. J. Gannon, was aware that patients were spreading 
the disease, and needed to be educated. He cited the case of a bartender with influenza who 
continued his bartending job in a café, and a woman from the South Side who requested an 
inspector not post a quarantine sign at her residence until after six in the evening when her card 
party would be over.68
On 6 October, in an article titled “Dally with an Epidemic”, the reporter noted “With 24 
deaths reported at the vital statistics bureau, and 56 new cases of influenza reported to the 
contagious division at 5 o’clock yesterday, Dr. E. H. Bullock, superintendent of the Hospital and 
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Health Board, insisted late last night the epidemic was ‘not yet dangerous.’”69 But the same article 
stated that General Hospital was full and patients were being turned away. Dr. A. J. Gannon was 
consulting with the city counselor to determine his authority in a crisis, and thus far he had 
“order[ed] all street cars scrubbed and disinfected before leaving the car barns and have his 
inspectors there to see it was done and order the cars back in the barn if it was not done.”70
An interesting side note concerns Dr. Maclay Lyon in his role as supervisor of medical 
inspections for schools. On 25 September 1918, there was an article about the status of the school 
medical inspection program. The Hospital and Health Board had no funds to pay for it, and the 
school department did not believe it was their duty to pay for it. The year before the entire sum, 
 Dr. 
Gannon learned that only the mayor could declare an emergency, so he called the mayor’s office to 
request this action. Moments after he did this Dr. Bullock came to Dr. Gannon’s office and 
“ordered” him to change his order to the street cars to a “request.” Dr. Bullock also rescinded the 
inspections of the cars. A second article quotes Dr. Maclay Lyon, supervisor of medical inspection 
for schools, as believing “the schools should be closed until the danger of the epidemic was past.” 
He noted that “Army authorities believe 60 percent of the cases of pneumonia resulting from 
influenza at the training detachment will prove fatal shows what might happen if the disease broke 
out in the city schools. For my part I don’t believe we should run the risk of exposing a whole 
school.” He went on to say that he did not have the authority to close the schools; only the Board 
of Health and the School Board could do that.  
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about $16,000, for the inspections was donated by a philanthropic citizen; but this year, despite 
“…twelve doctors and five nurses having volunteered their services...,”71
The situation in Kansas City nine days into the epidemic suggests that no effective 
measures had been taken. Dr. Bullock, presumably with the mayor’s blessing, was downplaying the 
seriousness of the situation and cancelling any measures that might have been put into effect. The 
schools remained open, the streetcars were crowded and dirty, crowds were not limited, and thus 
far city government had done nothing. Things soon changed, however, as the Chamber of 
Commerce became more involved.
 that was not enough to 
start the inspections, as at least eighty doctors were needed. Additionally, the budget for the 
Hospital and Health Board was already forecasting a deficit of about $6000, and that was without 
planning on funding the inspections. So if Dr. Lyon was unable to perform the supervision of 
inspections since no inspections were to be done, did he do something else for the schools? Or was 
this another political position that is a reward from the machine? There is no clear answer. 
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Chapter Three 
“FOR GOD’S SAKE MEN, DO SOMETHING.”1
On 7 October, Bernard A. Parsons, the president of the Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, 
and a manager at Parke Davis & Co.,
 
2 put into motion his plan that eventually forced the city to 
take action. It is unclear from newspaper accounts exactly why he was impressed about the 
seriousness of the situation and Dr. Bullock was not, but Mr. Parsons proved to be a man of action. 
Using his connections, Parsons summoned business men, the Red Cross, the mayor, and the 
Hospital and Health Board to a meeting, listened to all the arguments and then “gave a great array 
of indisputable facts that brought about drastic action by the mayor and health authorities and 
secured the acquiescence of business men affected by the summary closing order.”3
This was one of the prettiest pieces of strategy that I have seen in a long time. He knew 
what he wanted when he started out, and he got it by taking the shortest and most 
effective route. Results count in a case like this, and he certainly knows how to get them.
 The article 
goes on to quote from an unnamed man: 
4
Clearly, Mr. Parsons understood political life in Kansas City: it was better to be urged to do 
something than to propose an action yourself. With the first response there was political cover that 
was not there with the second. 
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The committee formed by Mr. Parsons decided that all actions were to be coordinated 
through the Hospital and Health Board, as they had the legal powers. A public order was issued 
consisting of forbidding gatherings of greater than twenty people; however, the Liberty Loan noon 
lunches were deemed a military necessity and thus exempt. The Kansas City Red Cross, headed by 
Major Dell Dutton, volunteered all of its personnel and facilities to the effort, as did the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. That offer meant that the Visiting Nurses Association was 
mobilized to help in the epidemic, as the Metropolitan Life Insurance employed some of the staff. 
Parsons’ committee planned to convert Convention Hall into a hospital, and install an additional 
one hundred cots in General Hospital. The Red Cross agreed to supply the furnishings. “A call for 
nurses was issued last night by Mrs. Harry Mather, Mrs. John Hayden and Miss Anne Tachudy. 
Graduate nurses, practical nurses and lay women are asked to report at once to room 404 Y.W.C.A. 
Building.”5   The nurses were assigned to General Hospital, other hospitals in town, and private 
homes. Even the Boy Scouts were recruited to pass out educational literature to every home in 
Kansas City and also post information about the influenza in public places.6
Through the committees’ efforts, preventative actions were put into motion, but once 
again political complications emerged. P.J. Kealy, President of the Metropolitan Streetcar Company, 
and a powerful local Democrat, knew revenue would drop if he reduced crowding on the 
streetcars. Dr. Gannon tried once again on 7 October to force the streetcars to limit to “no more 
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than 20 persons,”7 and also wanted the cars cleansed before being returned to service, and tried to 
post inspectors to make sure this was done. However, his plan for limiting the virus was blocked 
once again. He telephoned Chief Godley, the chief of police, for policemen to help enforce the 
order, and the chief was quoted as saying “I’ll give you all you want.”8  In response, Dr. Bullock and 
Harry Benjamin, a Republican member of the Health Board, confronted Dr. Gannon and informed 
him that W.P. Motley, Health Board president, must agree to any request using the police. Dr. 
Bullock and Mr. Benjamin asked Dr. Gannon to put the request in writing and they would take it to 
W.P. Motley. On their return Dr. Bullock stated, “I don’t believe the request is necessary at this 
time.”9 Dr. Bullock told Dr. Gannon that streetcar officials had called him and complained they were 
being “persecuted,”10 and that they were keeping the cars clean on their own. Dr. Gannon pointed 
out that the day before health inspectors checked many newly fumigated streetcars, and found 
them dirty.11 The inspectors were forced to return the streetcars to the barn for cleaning. Dr. 
Gannon noted that the company only had “…two women at the Tenth Street barn, the Kansas side, 
to keep seventy-five cars clean.”12
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20.”13
We don’t need the police department, and we don’t want the police department. If the 
streetcar company shows a disposition to comply with our requests it is not necessary to 
call the police. The police are needed only when there are riots and disorder. Until such 
conditions exist we will go ahead ourselves enforcing the city ordinances without the police 
department’s help. We are not going to cause the street car company any trouble in this 
matter. We are not going to start a row.
 Mr. Motley believed that the streetcar company was complying with city requests and did 
not think the Board should interfere in business. Clearly, Mr. Motley had his priorities: 
14
Nevertheless, Dr. Gannon did not relent; on 9 October in an article titled “Epidemic is Not 
Checked,” Mr. Kealy “promises” to keep the cars clean and “attempt” to limit overcrowding, 
beyond a “reasonable” limit. Dr. Gannon argued, “If the company fails to keep its promises another 
attempt to secure the assistance of the police department will be made….This assistance has been 
promised by Scott A. Godley, the chief.”
 
 
15
While Dr. Gannon was arguing over streetcars, other actions set in motion were playing 
out. The plan to use Convention Hall as a temporary hospital was shelved due to a lack of kitchen 
and sanitation facilities.
 Why were Dr. Bullock, the mayor, and the rest of the 
Health Board protecting the Metropolitan Railway? Both the owner, Bernard A. Corrigan, and the 
president of the railway, P.J. Kealy, were local Democratic bosses aligned with Pendergast and 
Shannon. It could be a risky political move to alienate him, since all the members of the Board were 
machine appointees. 
16
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Columbus to use their clubhouse at 3200 Main Street for an emergency hospital. The Red Cross 
planned to equip it with one hundred cots. Officials also cancelled a plan to erect tents near 
General Hospital due to the expense of building sewers. The Red Cross supplied General Hospital 
with numerous medical supplies, and the hospital added to the number of beds available by 
converting other spaces. Additionally, the Red Cross chapter formed a unit of “5 graduate nurses 
and 20 nongraduates” and offered their services to General Hospital.17
Staffing in the hospitals was a critical problem. General Hospital had already suffered the 
loss of “fifty-four percent of the attending and interne staff….having left to do service in Army or 
Navy in 1917-1918.”
 
18 Now, the few remaining staff were becoming ill and the numbers of available 
replacements were very limited. St. Joseph Hospital requested ten nurses from the Red Cross, and 
Research Hospital requested eight.19 St. Luke’s Hospital reported nine nurses down with influenza; 
General Hospital reported four nurses and one interne.20
On 9 October 1918, now that Dr. Gannon was satisfied with the response of the railway 
company, he turned his attention to other sources of contagion. He ordered all used clothing stores 
 As the epidemic gained momentum, it 
became clear that there simply were not enough hospital beds or nurses to care for all the 
influenza cases. 
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to close until they could be fumigated as he believed this could be a source of infection.21 He issued 
instructions to avoid the “promiscuous use of public telephones,”22 reminded everyone that 
influenza funerals needed to be private with no open caskets,23 and recommended to Mayor 
Cowgill that the streets be cleaned and the sewers flushed at night.24 The mayor agreed to this 
recommendation and ordered the street cleaning department, with the assistance of the Fire 
Department, to do this each night until the epidemic was over.25
Kansas City, Kansas was experiencing the flu outbreak as well. City governments might 
respect the state line division, but germs do not. Thus, unless the two Kansas City’s cooperated on 
an influenza response, it would not be terribly effective. The Kansas City Star covered events on 
both sides of the state line, and on 9 October reported that the Kansas side of the city has now 
closed all schools and banned “all public gatherings until the danger of influenza is past.”
 
26 Unlike 
the Missouri side, there is no mention of disagreement with the closing orders. In fact, the article 
noted cooperation with the order from M.E. Pearson, the superintendent of the public schools, H.E. 
Dean, a representative of the moving pictures association, Rev. A.J. Hollingsworth of the Kansas 
Side Ministerial Alliance, and R.J. Higgins, the street railway representative.27
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of Commerce, which was in charge of war fund raising, even cancelled the Fourth Liberty Loan 
parade and events.28 Additionally, Dr. A.P. Davis stated that five hundred Mexicans in Armourdale, 
an immigrant neighborhood in Kansas City, Kansas were sick, and he was in need of an interpreter 
to explain the situation to them.29
Dr. Gannon continued his efforts to curtail the disease, and on 10 October he urged the 
public to remain at home until the epidemic was past. Additionally, city health inspectors closed 
“three dental colleges and eight barber colleges,”
 
30 with Dr. Gannon stating that conditions were 
especially bad at the barber colleges since one towel might be used on as many as fifty 
customers.31 The paper noted large crowds waiting on street corners for streetcars, but 
commended the Metropolitan Railway and its president, P.J. Kealy for “sincere efforts” to 
cooperate.32 Dr. Gannon offered to place inspectors on the cars after complaints of spitting; it was 
a misdemeanor subject to arrest and an appearance in police court.33
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On Friday 11 October, the headline in the Kansas City Star read “Epidemic is Checked,”34 
and health officials planned to meet with the Mayor at ten in the morning to discuss when to lift 
the ban on public meetings. Dr. Bullock predicted that it would be lifted by tomorrow. Cases had 
decreased enough at General Hospital that the Red Cross signaled that they will not open the 
temporary hospital they had planned at the Knights of Columbus clubhouse, and Dr. Maclay Lyon, 
school inspection department, urged the rapid fumigation of the eighty public schools so that they 
would be ready to open on the following Monday.35 The situation on the Kansas side was less 
optimistic. The city health commissioner, Dr. C.W. McLaughlin, expanded his efforts and requested 
city undertakers not to hold public funerals in influenza deaths. The Red Cross offered its services 
on the Kansas side as well, and the offer was accepted. Even with Red Cross help and all city 
departments cooperating, 142 new cases were reported on Thursday 9 October, and there were 
seven deaths.36
The meeting of the Health Board at the mayor’s office on Friday was productive. Dr. Bullock 
proposed lifting the ban since the cases were so decreased and the ban was “hampering the city’s 
business by keeping public places closed after the danger has passed.”
 
37
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 W.P. Motley, head of the 
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have the power to nullify the order.”38 When Dr. Bullock consulted with Dr. Gannon, Dr. Jabez 
Jackson and Major Dell Dutton of the local Red Cross, and Captain A.A. Hobbs of the Army Motor 
School that afternoon at General Hospital, all advised not to lift the ban, at least before Monday.39
I believe Dr. Bullock’s action is drastic. I cannot see why public places should remain closed 
when he told us this morning the danger was past. The action of Dr. Bullock is final for the 
present. So far as I know now there will be no further meetings of the board to overrule 
him.
 
With the exception of Dr. Gannon, Dr. Jackson and Captain Hobbs were both isolated from local 
political pressure, but Dr. Bullock was persuaded by their arguments and agreed with them. This 
decision was not one that Mr. Motley wanted to hear and the Kansas City Star quoted him:  
40
Throughout the weekend of 11 and 12 October, the news from the health department was 
very comforting. But Dr. Gannon did take notice of some Kansas City undertakers. The American 
Express Company reported to the Health Board that some undertakers were using chauffeurs or 
inexperienced students to keep up with the embalming workload, and Dr. Gannon pledged to make 
sure only licensed embalmers would be used.
 
 
41 However, cases were on the decline, discharges 
were increasing at General Hospital, Dr. Gannon was maintaining his attempts to control contagion, 
and “was pleased” with the ban being continued.42
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An interesting dichotomy was noted between the assessment of the situation by Missouri 
officials and the Kansas officials. Dr. C.W. McLaughlin, a Kansas health officer, was quoted in the 
Kansas City Star, “The State Line saloons are breeding places of influenza. If these places were in 
Kansas they would be closed. They are crowded all day with foreigners and they are poorly 
ventilated.”43 He continued that local business men reported “last night these saloons were filled 
with whites, Mexicans and negroes. Many occupied card tables and other crowds watched the 
players.”44
On 14 October, despite all the comforting remarks from the members of the Health 
Department, the headline “Object to Lifting Ban” appeared. The article highlighted the difference of 
opinion between the Army, who was advising that the ban stay in place, and the Kansas City Health 
Department, who felt it was safe to remove.
 Clearly, there are racial and class differences between the saloon goers and the business 
owners that are causing tensions. Additionally, Dr. McLaughlin seems frustrated with his inability to 
control the situation so close to home, and the incident demonstrated that relations between the 
two cities might not be as cooperative as might be hoped. Also, it was probable that Kansas City 
officials did not police the saloons since Tom Pendergast was a saloon operator, liquor distributor, 
and gambling owner. Therefore, these businesses were under his protection and operated outside 
the law.  
45
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allowing the theaters and moving pictures to open that afternoon.46 Later he did allow that “if 
overruled by the doctors” he would submit, but added that business and other avenues of thought 
should be considered as well as the medical end.”47 Dr. Bullock and Dr. Gannon were quoted as 
supporting the ban removal, but Captain Hobbs, the medical officer for the Army schools noted 
that the Schools had been quarantined for three weeks, while the city had only enforced “semi-
quarantine” for a week.48
When the Health Board met with the mayor, the result was as expected. On the side of 
lifting the ban were Mayor Cowgill, Mr. Motley, Dr. Bullock, and Dr. Gannon. On the side favoring 
keeping the ban in place were Captain Hobbs, H.L. Benjamin, Major Dutton and Dr. Jackson.
 
49 The 
meeting was spirited, with Captain Hobbs stating that “…the responsibility for 400,000 lives rested 
on the board’s shoulders,”50 and “Army requirements are for three weeks’ quarantine.”51 Major 
Dutton commented that “I consider it very unwise to lift the ban. The history of other epidemics 
shows this to be the critical time. To lift the ban now is to invite a return of the epidemic.”52
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
 Mr. 
Motley argued the opposite view and urged members to support removal of the ban stating, “…if 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
49 "Lift Ban under Protest," Kansas City Star, October 14 1918. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
46 
 
we have made a mistake we can rectify it later on.”53 Captain Hobbs replied that death cannot be 
rectified. “A dead man cannot accept apologies.”54
The actions of the Missouri officials were hard to justify when taken in context with the 
situation in the city, and the actions of the Kansas officials. The city health inspectors had just that 
day quarantined an entire neighborhood around 917 Union Avenue. Two sisters, Ascension 
Lemarno, four, and Sophia Lemarno, six, had been found alone and freezing in a shack with fevers 
of 104. Their mother had died of influenza on 11 October and been buried, and there was no sign of 
the girls’ father. Although the children were taken to the hospital, doctors did not believe they 
would survive.
 Despite his forceful arguments, the city lifted 
the ban at noon, 14 October 1918.  
55 And Kansas officials kept their ban in place, after a conference with the Health 
Board, School Board, and the Mayor. The Kansas City Star reported on several tragic circumstances 
of children losing their parents, but the state of the family of William C. Little and his four children, 
on the Kansas side, was particularly tragic. William, the father, died on 12 October, Hazel, eleven 
years old, died on 13 October, and the three remaining orphans, Wilfred, seven, George, five, and 
Martha, three, remained critically ill with pneumonia following influenza at St. Mary’s Hospital.56
 Later on 14 October the Board of Education in Kansas City called a special meeting. Board 
members heard many of the same arguments heard by the Health Board, but they responded 
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differently. The schools remained closed for at least another week. I.I. Cammack, superintendent of 
schools, stated that originally the schools had agreed to be open once the ban was lifted, but the 
meeting was called and the decision changed once it became clear that lifting the ban “was 
contrary to the advice of physicians.”57
 Kansas side city officials were urging caution, but no alarm, from the public on the morning 
of 15 October. Indeed, Kansas officials maintained a consistent message; be careful, but do not be 
frightened, we have the situation under control. Officials were worried about how to care for whole 
families who have come down with the disease, as in the Little case. They named a committee of 
seven, with Mayor Mendenhall as the chairman, to take charge of the work. Volunteers were 
sought to offer nursing care to these families, and motor cars were provided for the volunteers to 
make their rounds. Although the city’s health department was without funds, J.L. Beggs, the 
commissioner of streets, offered money and his entire department for the use of the committee.
 These responses suggest that the School Board felt less 
political pressure than the Health Board. Closing the schools did not affect the local bosses in the 
same way as closing businesses. 
58 
The newspaper reported on conditions at the local hospitals; four nurses at Bethany Hospital were 
ill and one floor was devoted to influenza patients, two floors of St. Margaret’s Hospital were solely 
for influenza cases, and black patients could obtain care at Douglass Hospital.59
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reported to the health commissioner, Dr. McLaughlin.60 Stores on the Kansas side promised not to 
hold sales until the epidemic eased, and the police were “instructed to prohibit crowds gathering at 
any place for any purpose.”61
On the Missouri side disagreements continued to flare between Mr. Motley, the Health 
Board President, and Dr. Gannon, the Chief of Contagious Diseases. Mr. Motley was quoted, “I 
didn’t know it was so bad,”
 
62 and “I would not have voted to lift the ban,”63 upon hearing the 
secretary of the Health Board report “753 new cases of influenza developed in Kansas City from 6 
October to 13 October, with deaths from 27 September to the present time totaling 142.”64 Dr. 
Gannon was called to the meeting and Mr. Motley confronted the doctor with the differences in 
cases Dr. Gannon gave him the night before at their meeting, and the numbers reported that day. 
Dr. Gannon responded that confusion over whether to count a case as old or new was the source of 
differing numbers; “There were only twenty-eight bona fide new cases of influenza yesterday, Mr. 
Motley.”65 The newspaper article noted that emotions were high during this discussion, but “the 
atmosphere cleared,”66
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someone to blame for his strong support to lift the restrictions once he understood the seriousness 
of the situation.  
The Times continued to report on the disagreement between the two men, the differing 
number of cases, and a new dispute between the Health Board and the Board of Education, in the 
following days’ paper. Mr. Motley was quoted, “The reports [made by Dr. Gannon] regarding the 
influenza epidemic had been confused and garbled.”67 The reporter questioned a clerk in the 
Contagious Diseases office about new cases for the day and was told that the information on case 
numbers can only come from Dr. Gannon. When the clerk was queried about the change in policy 
no definitive answer was given, just that he will have to wait for Dr. Gannon. The reporter also 
noted that when Dr. Gannon gave out his numbers, they were lower than the numbers the clerk 
was overheard giving out to a friend.68 That information obtained by the reporter seemed to be the 
source of the secondary headline of the article, “Investigation Shows That Reports are Being 
Suppressed.”69
The school board met early Monday afternoon and announced school would reopen. As 
head of the Health Board I instructed Dr. E. H. Bullock, city health director, to notify the 
school board it could not reopen school until it complied with our sanitary orders. The 
school board met and revoked its opening order, then slipped the blame to disagreement 
in our board. We are informed it has not fumigated the buildings and has swept and 
scrubbed in a half-way manner.
 The final point of disagreement occurred between Mr. Motley and the Board of 
Education. Mr. Motley explained the situation from his point of view. 
70
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I. I. Cammack, the superintendent of schools, disagreed with Mr. Motley’s version of events. He is 
quoted as insisting that the board revoked the opening order once they learned removing the ban 
was against the advice of physicians. Another member of the Board of Education, Dr. W. A. Armour, 
was quoted responding to Mr. Motley about the cleanliness of the schools, “Such an assertion is 
very broad for a man who has no more information upon the subject than Mr. Motley.”71
 The Chamber of Commerce appeared in the news again on 16 October. The Board of 
Directors requested that Mayor Cowgill issue an emergency proclamation of quarantine through 
the Hospital and Health Board.
 
72 The Chamber of Commerce based its concern on reports that all 
the Kansas City suburbs, including the towns on the Kansas side, had bans in place. The Chamber 
was worried that people from outlying areas were coming to Kansas City, Missouri for 
entertainment, since it was the only town in the greater area that did not have a ban. The Mayor 
announced that “no action will be taken tonight,”73 however he arranged a meeting of the Hospital 
and Health Board for later that evening, where he was quoted saying “The previous ban was not 
effective.”74
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is longer necessary to hamper business by a continuance of the ban. The responsibility of 
preventing its spread should be assumed by the individual….”75
One of Dr. Gannon’s earlier orders on 9 October, in consultation with the Mayor, was that 
the streets and sewers were to be flushed daily. Mayor Cowgill had agreed and issued the order. On 
16 October, the Times reported that this measure was not being done because of a lack of water. 
The Water Department was in the process of cleaning the water basin at the Quindaro pumping 
station. Due to the cleaning there was a fifteen million gallon shortage of water in the system. The 
article noted “because of the dry fall sewers are foul all over the city. This is true particularly in the 
residence districts. Numerous complaints have been made. There can be no relief, unless the basin 
cleaning is stopped, until next Monday.”
  
76
On the Kansas side, city officials were calling for volunteers, especially nurses. The Visiting 
Nurse Association on that side had only seven nurses, and the paper reported that “three are ill 
from exhaustion.”
 The most obvious question was why did the water 
department start cleaning the basin if they knew about the order since 9 October? Did the Mayor 
or Dr. Gannon not communicate the order? Or was it a case of a local political appointee doing 
what they pleased without regard to orders from other departments? Unfortunately, records do 
not exist that would give a definitive answer. 
77
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Kansas side volunteered, they were deputized as health officials. The public was notified to call a 
minister if help was needed caring for someone with influenza.78
Back in Missouri, on 17 October, the Times was reporting yet again on the activist president 
of the Chamber of Commerce, Bernard A. Parsons. The article detailed his investigation of the 
accuracy of the case reporting, “…not more than one in ten cases were being reported…;”
  Officials report more than 1300 
cases. 
79 the 
losses that would be incurred if a ban was enacted again, “the Chamber of Commerce alone, it was 
pointed out, will lose $10,000 outright as the result of its guarantee to the Soil Products 
Exposition…;”80 and the duty he felt, “…the lives of Kansas Citians should be placed above personal 
gain.”81 The theatrical interests of the city, voiced by Dr. Harry Cartinsky, offered the only positive 
view of the current situation, “…the disease is on the wane, and that only one hospital outside of 
the General has influenza patients under treatment.”82 Mrs. Harry Mather, head of the Red Cross 
nurses division, disputed this view of the situation, “I must apologize to the doctor first for 
correcting him, as a nurse must in correcting a physician. But the truth of the matter is that right 
now practically every hospital in Kansas City has influenza patients under treatment.”83
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on to name the private hospitals and their numbers of patients. Mrs. Mather must have been very 
agitated, as evidenced by her contradicting a doctor, but she had more to say on the subject: 
You men consider how you can protect your business while the lot of caring for the sick 
falls to us. Women are dying while they care for the sick in this epidemic and you sit and 
decide how many people you will let die.84
Other physicians and leading citizens were quoted as supporting Mrs. Mather’s assessment; Dr. 
Jabes Jackson of the Red Cross, wealthy local businessman R. A. Long, local Dr. P. T. Bohan, the 
President of the Kansas Chamber of Commerce H. H. Daniels, and Captain A. A. Hobbs of the Army 
Motor School. Perhaps the most fervent plea for action came from Dr. Richard Sutton, who spoke 
at the meeting just before he left to care for his sister and her husband dying of pneumonia, 
“Fifteen percent of these cases develop into pneumonia and from 50 to 90 percent of the 
complicated cases die in spite of all that physicians can do. There is nothing in the world that will 
save them. For God’s sake men, do something.”
 
 
85
Mayor Cowgill, John Eames, his secretary, and the Commissioner of Police John R. Ransom, 
all attend a meeting later on 17 October at General Hospital. The Mayor seemed to be trying to get 
a sense of how the physicians at General Hospital felt about the handling of the epidemic. General 
Hospital was staffed by about sixty physicians, and over half of them attended the meeting with the 
Mayor. They agreed that this was the most infectious epidemic in Kansas City’s history, and were 
together in supporting drastic action by the city.
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Sloan, W. J. Frick, and F. M. McCallum to decide on the measures. The measures this committee 
proposed were as follows: 
1. Closing of schools, theaters, picture shows, churches and prohibition of all public 
gatherings not essential to government work. 
2. Street cars to carry no standing passenger and to keep windows open. 
3. Strict quarantine of influenza patients, and release only after examination.  
4. Immediate report of cases by physicians. 
5. Appointment of quarantine officers, including school teachers, to visit houses and 
instruct well members of family how to prevent spread of disease.  
6. Appointment of scientific committee to advise health board.  
7. Publication of preventive measures.87
Although Health Board members Mr. Motley, Harry Benjamin, B.L. Hart, and Dr. Bullock were all 
present at the meeting, none of them are noted as favoring a return of quarantine. But other 
doctors were highlighted speaking in favor of this ban. Drs. George Mosher, C. Lester Hall, R. T. 
Sloan, John Punton, Herman Pearse, William Frick, Scott P. Child, John Thompson, B. G. Hamilton, J. 
D. Griffith, and Frank C. Neff all spoke in favor of the measure proposed. Only Mr. Motley defended 
the streetcars owners and theater operators, and warned the doctors, “If the ban was renewed it 
would be far more effective that the first one….”
 
 
88 Despite Mr. Motley’s stance, the quarantine 
measures were adopted by the medical staff. Dr. J. D. Griffith challenged Mr. Motley, asked if he 
had anything to say in reply, and Mr. Motley answered “Well, we can add something on to it if we 
want to, can’t we?”89
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for it yourself.”90
 The first test of the new regulations was already underway. A large meeting of national and 
international farmers, with an accompanying exhibit, was planned. The International Farm Congress 
meeting started the morning of 17 October, and the International Soil Products Exhibit was due to 
open that night in Convention Hall. An article in the Times speculated on the possibility that the 
two events might be exempted.
 Mr. Benjamin, Mr. Hart, and Dr. Bullock all concurred with the need to follow the 
recommendation of the staff. That night the evening edition published the Mayor’s proclamation 
(see appendix b), and the regulations issued by the Health Board (see appendix c). 
91  Mr. W. J. Drummond, the exhibit manager, believed that the 
large hall and excellent ventilation in the Convention Hall could reduce the chance of spreading 
influenza, but felt it was his duty to put the health of the citizens of Kansas City before profit, and 
follow the decision of the authorities.92 Mayor Cowgill and the Health Board favored an 
exemption,93 arguing that the staff at General Hospital “favors allowing the exhibit to proceed.”94 
However, members of the Farm Congress meeting immediately adjourned once they heard of the 
ban on public gatherings, leaving the decision to Mr. Drummond, who did not request an 
exemption for the Exhibit.95
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violate the ban.96
 Several new events were featured in the papers on the 18 October. The Health Department 
took note of a “private dance given last night,”
 It would seem fair to question the actions of Mayor Cowgill and the General 
Hospital staff. Why did the General Hospital staff propose, and the Mayor approve a ban, and then 
just hours later both were arguing in favor of ignoring the sound advice that had been given and 
the action that was taken?  The Mayor was an owner of a large ranch in Kansas, and it might be 
possible, but unlikely, that he had some underlying interests in the Exhibit, however it seems far 
more probable that the Exhibition was forecast to make a considerable amount of money in Kansas 
City, and the mayor was taking that fact into consideration. But what was behind the actions of the 
hospital staff? One explanation is that although the staff agreed that urgent action was needed, 
they were split over the form that action might take. For example, if one believed that miasmas 
were the cause of the epidemic, then crowds do not matter as much as clean air. There are no 
records that would give a clearer picture of their motivations. 
97 the “refusal of many persons living in Little Italy to 
clean up,”98(apparently this included both tenants and owners), and the need for physicians to 
cooperate with the Health Department. Dr. Bullock reported 219 deaths during the ten days ending 
on 16 October, and it was noted that the day with the second highest death toll, 14 October, with 
twenty-one deaths, was the day the first ban had been lifted.99
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was now requesting daily reports from health officials in Kansas City.100 Morgues were not able to 
keep up with the demand for their services, and bodies were tagged for identification while 
awaiting disposition.101 The Retail Merchants Association adopted a resolution endorsing the 
Health Board and Mayor, and issued the following statement: “The health of the people comes first 
and our stores second with us. We believe the Hospital and Health Board has acted wisely and well 
and we will back the board to the best of our ability….”102
The theater interests took a different view of the situation. A mass meeting was called at 
the Wonderland Theater, and Mr. Motley, President of the Health Board, attended and allowed 
that he signed the closing ban “under protest and simply because he was compelled to by virtue of 
his office.”
  
103 Maintaining his political stance, Motley argued that he was not in favor of the ban as 
enacted, and that he believed the theater owners were being targeted unfairly. After lively 
discussion the theater owners approved their own resolution; they would volunteer to inspect all 
the places that were permitted to be open. Additionally, they attempted to pass a second 
resolution recommending forced closure of all businesses; only war industries, butcher shops, 
grocery and drug stores could remain open. This resolution failed as no second could be found.104
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The paper slyly noted that 150 people attended the meeting, thus violating the ban on crowds over 
twenty.  
Dr. Gannon was featured in the Star on 18 October offering advice on avoiding the flu; his 
recommendations included onions, garlic, cleanliness, and avoidance of kissing. “…There is a great 
deal of kissing going on in this city every twenty-four hours and if a ban should be placed on it there 
would be considerable less influenza in a few days.”105
 Stay out of crowds. 
 Avoid all dust. 
 Keep the bowels active by laxatives. 
 Keep the kidneys active by drinking water freely. 
 Stay away from sick people. 
 Consult a physician if you feel ill—then follow his advice. 
 Eat plenty of wholesome food. 
 Dress sensibly in keeping with the weather. 
 Sleep on sleeping porch if possible; if not, keep room well ventilated but avoid drafts.
 Wash the throat frequently with salt solution.
 Dr. John Thompson advocated following the 
regulations and advice of physicians, Dr. J.D. Griffith urged a teaspoon of soda in a pint of boiled 
water three or four times a day, and Dr E. H. Bullock proffered the following: 
106
Officials on the Kansas side of the city did not seem to have as much difficulty due to lack of 
cooperation with the closing orders, their problem was a lack of facilities and of caregivers. There 
are only two hospitals and both were full, and the staff was short handed. The school board offered 
the use of the schools as temporary hospitals, and the city planned to pay for the expense of 
converting them for use.
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light and water department and the finance department, together raised $10,000 for the 
emergency hospital, city departments raised another $5700, the Wyandotte County commissioners 
raised $3000, and the Board of Education offered to furnish the rest of the money required to get 
the Junior High School ready to be used as a hospital.108 Kansas motion pictures operators, perhaps 
trying to distance themselves from the furor on the Missouri side, notified the health authorities of 
their “stand that the quarantine should [not] be lifted and were willing to remain closed another 
week if necessary.”109 The governor of Kansas and the State Board of Health of Kansas extended 
their closing order another week.110 Emphasizing the shortage of personnel was the note that 
although the city ambulance received sixty-two calls for assistance, there was no doctor to send out 
with the ambulance, and of the fifty nurses at Bethany Hospital, twenty-one were ill.111
An interesting editorial appeared in the 18 October edition of the Star. It questioned the 
abilities of W. P. Motley, the president of the Hospital and Health Board. The writer called him 
dangerous, a representative of business interests and not the public, and stated “It is unthinkable 
that this sort of man, who was ready to set up his private opinion against the best medical opinion 
in town, should continue at the head of a board charged with guarding the city’s health.”
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seemed apparent from this editorial that at least some of the citizens of Kansas City recognized that 
politics was heavily involved in public health matters. 
By 19 October General Hospital was reporting 150 patients, the most since the epidemic 
began.113 Old City Hospital, also known as General Hospital #2, reported fifty-six cases, and 
specifically mentioned that most of these cases “… were Mexicans, not Negroes.”114 Dr. Bullock was 
blaming the change of weather for an increase in deaths recently, offering that the “dampness and 
chill”115 of the last day had made the epidemic worse. The bad news continued on 20 October with 
172 patients at General Hospital, the isolation hospital full, and only room for about twenty more 
patients on the fourth floor emergency ward.116 The medical staff at General Hospital compiled a 
list of rules for the public, and the Red Cross agreed to distribute the pamphlets (see appendix d) 
through educational clinics that were established in Red Cross workrooms across the city.117
Dr. Gannon made the rounds of the city visiting patients on Monday 21 October. He was 
very critical of the filthy living conditions that many landlords forced tenants to endure, and 
condemned the landlords for removing the “Unfit for Human Habitation” signs health inspectors 
had posted. Dr. Gannon concentrated his concern in an area of Kansas City called McClure Flats, 
located between Nineteenth and Twentieth Streets and McGee and Grand Streets. He believed that 
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the area always had many cases of whatever epidemic was occurring, and vowed to try to have the 
entire area torn down and replaced.118 Additionally, the Star reported a “desperate” need for 
nurses and nurses’ aides.119 Mrs. Harry Mather of the Red Cross was so eager to find volunteers 
that she stated they need have no experience, simply good health and an ability to work long 
hours.120 Dr. Bullock went on record as suggesting that any worker “serving the public” should do 
so wearing a gauze mask.121
The news on 21 and 22 October on the Kansas side was a little better. The state of Kansas 
had located six government physicians and would send them to Kansas City, Kansas to assist in the 
fight against the disease.
 He also encouraged everyone to begin wearing masks when out in 
public. 
122 Dr. C.W. McLaughlin hoped to use them to care for the poor in 
dispensaries around the city.123
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for patients in the home. Officials had not had to open the emergency hospital in the school as of 
yet, and twenty women had volunteered to assist the Visiting Nurses Association.124
In Kansas City, Missouri on 23 October, the report was of 176 new cases of influenza,
 
125 and 
that deaths from all causes that month were the largest on record since the establishment of the 
department.126 Dr. Bullock continued to voice his request that citizens wear gauze masks and the 
paper made note of several large employers who were requiring employees to wear them; these 
included the Kansas City Railway Company, Montgomery Ward and Company, Procter and Gamble, 
the U. S. Post Office, and the Cudahy Packing Company.127 The nursing shortage continued, and 
Miss Geraldine Borland, the nursing supervisor at General Hospital, was forced to decline a request 
for nurses from Washington, as she had none to spare.128 Apartment house owners were chastised 
by both Dr. Bullock and Walter L. Lampkin, the local fuel administrator, for telling tenants that “…it 
is against the fuel administration’s orders to burn fires in furnaces until the weather becomes 
colder,”129 after many complaints about cold buildings were received at the Health Board. Mr. 
Lampkin accused the owners of being “unpatriotic,”130
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Association so they could present a case for a later closing hour than 4 pm. Mr. Motley had already 
favored their request, but Mr. Benjamin discounted most of their arguments, and referred the 
request for consultation with the Mayor when he returned.131
An interesting human relations angle towards the flu was highlighted on 17 October. Dr. 
Gannon fired D. W. De Orgler, a health inspector, after De Orgler told a restaurant owner that he 
would clean up his place to meet the health codes for $60. Dr Gannon questioned the restaurant 
owner as to why he was not cleaning his place up, and the story came out. De Orgler told Dr. 
Gannon that he had paid $40 of the money to another man to do the job, and only had kept $20. 
Dr. Gannon forced both men to return the money, and to sign an I.O.U. for the $16 that they had 
already spent, in addition to firing De Orgler.
  
132 De Orgler seemed to be a local con artist; he was 
described making patriotic speeches as Baron De Orgler, and claimed to be Austrian. Earlier, the 
Federal authorities had arrested him on suspicion of being a spy (the U.S. was at war with Austria) 
but De Orgler had been released after it was determined he was “harmless.”133
The Star published an article on 24 October decrying the influence of the “boss” system on 
public health in Kansas City.
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and the charges disappeared. John W. Parker, who had been the superintendent of the sanitary 
division of the Hospital and Health Board for fourteen years reported, “We have the ordinances, 
but they are rarely enforced. Human life is the cheapest commodity in Kansas City, and even in a 
time like this, when deaths from one disease are mounting into the hundreds, there is still the same 
indifference.”135
Dr. Bullock assessed the public health effort the morning of 24 October. It was his belief 
that progress was being made since cases were not increasing, but holding steady. He seemed 
hopeful that cases would begin decreasing in the next three or four days, and prominent physicians 
agreed with that view.
 Several years earlier, Mr. Parker had attempted to work with the police 
department to clean up the city. He produced for each police precinct a booklet with citations the 
officers could fill out, and then delivered them to the precincts. He later wanted to find a sample 
and looked in his closest precinct to see if they had any left. He was frustrated to find that they had 
never even been opened. Mr. Parker recounted that he could not recall a single arrest or 
prosecution, in his fourteen year tenure as Superintendent, for a health or sanitary ordinance 
violation. 
136 However, General Hospital was now at capacity, and had requested the 
Red Cross to mobilize fifty beds.137
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lifted, the hall was closed and the heating apparatus removed for the winter.138 Lieutenant Charles 
D. Shelton was the public health officer in charge on the Kansas side, and he was also encouraged 
since the numbers of patients admitted and discharged were about the same. Miss H. A. Dunham, 
of the Red Cross visiting nurses’, reported there were now enough volunteers to staff the hospitals, 
and nurses might again start visiting home cases.139 The first mention of any political wrangling on 
the Kansas side appeared on 24 October. It was noted that pool halls were ordered closed ten days 
before, but they remained open. Health officials ordered them closed a second time, but somehow 
they were not included after the city commissioners saw the list. The Army closed them on 24 
October without argument.140
On Friday 25 October, just one day short of a month since the epidemic began, Mr. Parsons, 
President of the Chamber of Commerce was quoted:  
 
The situation is far more serious than the public has been permitted to know. We face a 
startling situation and the sooner we get down to “brass tacks” and meet it the sooner we 
will be able to clean it up. Every man and woman in Kansas City will have to help fight this 
epidemic and fight it with all their might. It is no time to slack.141
The Red Cross and the Chamber of Commerce met that morning to locate a building for a new 
emergency hospital. The need was urgent since they received reports of influenza patients having 
to “sit in chairs and hallways” at General Hospital while waiting for a bed.
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received an offer to use the Independence Boulevard Christian Church, and they intended to meet 
Mr. R.A. Long at the Church to assess its suitability. Since the need for beds was urgent, the group 
decided to move thirty patients from General Hospital to old Mercy Hospital. Old Mercy had been 
used for influenza students at the Army Motor School since the epidemic began there, but since the 
motor school students were improving so much, the decision was made to transform Mercy into a 
Red Cross hospital. It was under the command of Major Frank McGregor; Dr. Jabez N. Jackson of 
the Red Cross was the medical head, Mrs. Harry Mather supervised the nurses, and soldiers’ 
enforced quarantine. Although Dr. Bullock had general supervision over the hospital in his position 
as Health Director, it was decided that the Hospital and Health Board would have no role in this 
hospital, as it was felt they could not handle any additional duties. 143
 Although General Hospital was the only city hospital, in at least one case a private hospital, 
St. Mary’s Hospital, was asked to open its doors to all influenza patients. The Sisters at St. Mary’s 
initially were asked by Army officials from the Sweeney Motor School to take soldiers, but had to 
decline that request since they were full with surgical cases at that time. But by 3 October they had 
cleared out the fourth floor of the hospital and began to admit patients. The floor filled up quickly 
and the Sisters made available the second floor of the hospital also. Reports from the Sisters tell of 
the staff working twenty-four hours at a time. The working conditions were so difficult that every 
nursing sister eventually became ill. One story concerned Sister Mary Cypriana Mertens, who began 
caring for influenza patients on 3 October up on the fourth floor. By the last week of October she 
moved down to the second floor to assist there, and took over the care of influenza victim 
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Reverend Father Edmund Joseph Unruh. The Sister nursed the Father almost continuously for four 
straight days, and then became ill with influenza herself. As the doctor and her other Sisters cared 
for her, she informed them of a vision. She stated, “Do not worry, Doctor, you have done all in your 
power. God does not wish me to recover.”144 She died on 7 November, just two days after Father 
Unruh. A second nun, Sister Mary Antonia Schlochtermeyer, passed on five days later.145
 The need for anyone, whether trained or not, to care for the overwhelming numbers of 
patients, was also illustrated by the religious organizations in Kansas City. When the nursing sisters 
at St. Mary’s were unable to continue, they were replaced by teaching sisters. Both St. Agnes 
Academy’s Sisters of Mercy, and the Franciscan Sisters at the School of Our Lady of Sorrows, 
volunteered to assist at St. Mary’s. The need for nursing sisters was great, while the teaching sisters 
were not teaching since the schools were closed. 
 
 Many citizens stepped forward in the crisis to assist in any way they could. While most 
stories did not make the paper, on occasion there was a personal story. One such incident 
happened on 25 October, when the gas company appeared at the residence of Walter F. Hall, 1313 
Grand Avenue. His wife answered the door, and the gas man told her she either had to pay the bill 
or the gas would be turned off. She pleaded with him to leave it on as her husband was sick with 
influenza and pneumonia, and the gas man stated there was nothing he could do. The wife 
contacted Dr. Gannon, and he attempted to convince the gas company to turn the heat back on, 
but he was told that nothing could be done until the next day. Neighbors came to the aid of the 
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family, and all night long they heated bricks in their own apartments, and then carried them up to 
place in Mr. Hall’s bed, trying to keep him warm throughout the night.146 On 26 October it was 
reported that the gas company agreed to turn the gas back on for a few days, after a health 
inspector informed the gas company that a woman who had heard of the situation had agreed to 
pay the bill.147
 In contrast, Harry J. Sophian, the landlord at the fashionable Georgian Court apartments on 
the corner of Gillham and Armour informed the wife of a sick tenant that the Federal Fuel 
Administration prohibited him from turning on the heat in the building. Walter Lampkin, the local 
administrator for fuel, notified Mr. Sophian this was not the case, but Mr. Sophian declined to 
cooperate. Mr. Lampkin cited him to appear at the fuel committee headquarters on the next day.
Fortunately, Mr. Hall survived the cold and his illness. 
148
 On the Kansas side, Lieutenant C. D. Shelton began to recognize that dealing with an 
epidemic in a city was far different from dealing with an epidemic on a military base. The streetcar 
company on the Kansas side vowed to clean the cars and not allow crowding, so the Lieutenant was 
surprised when he started hearing complaints of crowding and dirty conditions on the cars. Kansas 
officials explained to him that “promises” to obey orders did not necessarily mean that promises 
would be fulfilled. Lt. Shelton stated, “I’m not used to promises. An order not to crowd means just 
 
Unfortunately, I found no record of what happened the next day. 
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what it says. The streetcar company must obey.”149 Saloons in Missouri, but near the Kansas line, 
took on a health role on 25 October. Some of them advertised “quinine and whisky” as an influenza 
preventative, and took no notice of the bans on crowds or public gatherings. Despite the 
protestations of Lieutenant Shelton that whisky and quinine were not effective, he was not able to 
shut them down since they were not in his jurisdiction.150
 On 26 October, the Red Cross and Chamber of Commerce committee made a final decision 
on the facility to use as an emergency hospital. The Linwood Boulevard Christian Church was the 
final selection, as it could be converted in just a few hours to hold 200 patients, sleeping quarters 
for nurses, and kitchen facilities.
 
151 Controversy continued over the numbers of case reports and 
deaths. Dr. Bullock denied there was a “cover-up,” but could not explain why the numbers given to 
him did not match the numbers reported in the newspapers. He offered that numbers might have 
been “muddled” since the clerk of the division had been sick. Dr. Gannon had another possible 
explanation for the confusion; that physicians were reporting cases once they were cured, and the 
paper was just reporting “new” cases.152
One of the most intriguing aspects of this epidemic was the relationship between Dr. 
Bullock and Dr. Gannon. Dr. Bullock seemed to be allied with Mr. Motley, and it was clear from the 
reports of squabbles in the newspaper that Mr. Motley did not trust Dr. Gannon. Earlier in the 
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epidemic he had called Dr. Gannon’s reports “confused and garbled,”153
On Sunday 27 October, both Dr. Gannon and Dr. Bullock were encouraged by the weather 
and the freeze that was coming. Both indicated that freezing weather and rain would eliminate the 
influenza epidemic by clearing the air, reminiscent of belief in the miasma theory. They were also 
encouraged by the twenty-four beds open at General Hospital, and felt there will be no need to 
open another emergency hospital in addition to the fifty beds provided at old Mercy Hospital 
 and now Dr. Bullock 
seemed to be blaming Dr. Gannon for more misleading data. Was he just taking a lead from Mr. 
Motley’s accusations earlier, or did he really believe that Dr. Gannon was incompetent?  As a 
practical matter, as with the 2009 H ₁N₁ pandemic, numbers of cases and deaths were adjusted 
upwards several times over the course of the event. Even with all the reporting technology that 
exists today the information does not always become clear until after the fact. In 1918, 
communication was the telephone, telegraph, messenger, and the mail. A doctor would have been 
forced to make the decision of whether or not to take time out of seeing sick patients to make sure 
his reports were correctly communicated in some way. It is safe to assume that many doctors were 
not doing this, despite all the pleadings from the Health Department. Trying to decide whether a 
case was “new” or previously reported was seemingly a very difficult task in a situation like this. 
Unless a name was associated with every case reported it would have been impossible. No records 
remain from the Health Department that could explain exactly what was in the report, so there is 
no way to verify what kind of data that Dr. Gannon was receiving. 
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yesterday.154 The encouraging news continued on 28 October, as both doctors agreed that the ban 
might be lifted by the end of the week, as long as the public continued to cooperate. Dr. Gannon 
was also proposing new regulations on places that served food and drink; all establishments would 
close for thirty minutes, morning and afternoon, in order to boil all dishes, cup and utensils in soda 
and water.155 Alderman William Flynn reportedly attempted to see the Mayor about removing the 
ban. Mr. Flynn owned the Wonderland Theater, and he had been influential when the original ban 
had been lifted. But this time he seemed to be thwarted, as Mayor Cowgill refused to make any 
move until the entire staff at General Hospital approved.156 Dr. Bullock explained that in most 
places the epidemic had lasted about seven weeks, and the middle of that period usually had the 
highest death toll. It was his feeling that Kansas City had just gotten through the worst week, and 
that cases should continue to decrease from then on.157
On 29 October, when the death toll was reported as forty-one, the highest number of 
deaths in one day in Kansas City history, Dr. Gannon explained that deaths were increasing among 
patients who were already sick due to the cold, and it did not mean the epidemic was worsening. 
Death statistics were reported as 561 since the epidemic began, with the majority of those caused 
by influenza and pneumonia.
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at “more than a thousand,” just for the month of October.159
Meanwhile, the merchants and the theater owners were chafing at the restrictions placed 
on them, and they convinced Mayor Cowgill to set up a meeting with Dr. Bullock, to present their 
case for easing the quarantine. The Mayor appears to have been a very canny politician, taking no 
personal position and commenting that he would be guided only by the recommendations of the 
staff at General Hospital, while at the same time facilitating the meeting between the business 
interests and the Health Board. Dr. Bullock, who had generally sided with Mr. Motley’s position 
opposing a strict ban, seems to have had a change of opinion. “An attempt may be made to secure 
a removal of the ban, but it will not come from those people whose home the influenza epidemic 
has touched,”
  The paper quotes Miss Ada Irmas, the 
clerk in charge at vital statistics, for both sets of numbers, but there was no explanation for why 
they were so different.  
160 Dr. Bullock stated. His daughter, Mrs. Leo J. Sherby, was reported as critically ill at 
St. Joseph Hospital, with little chance of survival.161 Dr. Gannon, who earlier in the week expressed 
his opinion that the ban might be lifted soon, was now advocating no change in restrictions. He 
expressed the opinion that cases were not decreasing as fast as he had hoped, so the ban should 
remain.162
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but Lieutenant Shelton warned “against relaxing precautions.”163 The Ministerial Alliance on the 
Kansas side was to meet with the Lieutenant and Mr. McLaughlin regarding cleaning the churches 
and if they may open next Sunday.164
Thus far, in the first six weeks of the pandemic, it was clear that none of the political 
appointees on the Missouri side were willing to lead the fight to impose a strict quarantine. The 
lead instead was taken by B. A. Parsons, the head of the Chamber of Commerce, who was 
supported in his efforts by some of the businesses in town, the local Army officials, the Red Cross, 
and the staff at General Hospital. On the Kansas side of town, things were much less political. There 
seemed to be a sense of cooperation and a willingness to sacrifice personal gain for the public 
good. Politicians on the Kansas side were beholden to the voters, not to the bosses of a political 
machine. 
 Lieutenant Shelton made no promises. 
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CHAPTER 4 
“IF IT TAKES EVERY PATROLMAN ON THE FORCE.”1
Mr. Motley was back in the headlines on 1 November. He had taken charge at General 
Hospital after Dr. Bullock was admitted to St. Joseph’s Hospital on 31 October with influenza. Mr. 
Motley requested that two “competent physicians” relieve him of this duty, and he reiterated the 
position of the Health Board to only lift the ban when the physicians at General Hospital approved 
of it. On the Kansas side there had been such improvement that the five government physicians 
were planning to leave within days. However, Lieutenant Shelton was not advocating a removal of 
restrictions. In his judgment both cities needed to remove the restrictions together.
 
2 By 3 
November the state of Kansas lifted its closing ban, but allowed local health boards to keep 
restrictions in place if they felt it was necessary. Kansas City, Kansas maintained the restrictions.3 
Lieutenant Shelton was recalled to Topeka, but recommended changes in public health to his 
successor, Dr. Clyde Leigh Appleby. His suggestions included having a full time public health officer, 
a dispensary, transportation, and a corps of nurses.4
                                                          
1 "Epidemic on the Wane?," Kansas City Star, 16 December 1918. 
 Additionally, Dr. Elvenor Ernest, a Kansas 
government physician, commended the volunteer women on the Kansas side for their “splendid 
work” during the crisis in taking care of families who were unable to care for themselves. About 
twenty-five volunteer women, supervised by Miss Laura Neiswanger of the Red Cross, and six other 
2 "No Move to Lift the Ban," Kansas City Star, 1 November 1918. 
3 "Lift State Ban in Kansas," Kansas City Star, 3 November 1918. 
4 "Alter Kansas Side Plans," Kansas City Star, 3 November 1918. 
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nurses and twelve medical students, worked tirelessly for twelve to fourteen hours a day in the 
tenements and immigrant districts of Kansas City, Kansas.5
A meeting of the Board of Health was scheduled for eight in the evening on 4 November at 
General Hospital. The agenda was to include the recommendations from the staff of the hospital on 
the advisability of lifting the ban. For the first time the paper mentioned that the Kansas City, 
Kansas health officials were invited to attend.
 
6 Both Dr. Bullock and Kansas officials agree the bans 
should be coordinated. On 5 November, however, the Kansas officials proposed lifting their ban on 
Thursday 7 November, at noon. Their accompanying statement was very revealing about the level 
of cooperation between Missouri and Kansas, “Since the situation is so improved, and since the 
situation on the Missouri side has no influence here, we recommend the ban be lifted on Thursday 
noon.”7
On Wednesday 6 November, after several days of reassuring messages from doctors and 
public health officials about the situation, suddenly the number of cases reported on both sides of 
the state line jumped. Missouri reported 107 cases, and Kansas reported twenty-five. Dr. J.S. 
Crumbine, secretary of the Kansas State Board of Health, stepped in and cancelled the plan to lift 
 Mr. Motley was quoted later in the same article as being in favor of modifying the Missouri 
ban, but reiterated again that the board would let the physicians at General Hospital make the final 
decision. Only nineteen new cases of influenza were reported that day. 
                                                          
5 "Says Women Turned Thetide," Kansas City Star, 1 November 1918. 
6 "Fix Ban Lifting Date Tonight," Kansas City Star, 4 November 1918. 
7 "To Lift Kansas Side Ban," Kansas City Star, 5 November 1918. 
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the Kansas side ban on Thursday.8 There was an unusual meeting in Kansas City, Missouri that 
Wednesday. W.P. Motley was present with about forty local business owners (remember there was 
a ban on meetings), to take up a proposal to lift the ban and instead simply quarantine homes, 
require clerks to wear masks, let only twenty people stand in streetcars, and seat patrons in movie 
theaters, with no standing allowed. Seven local ministers were also present, but J.S. Davis, a Baptist 
minister, questioned by whose authority the meeting had been called. He noted that the Chamber 
of Commerce was missing, as was a majority of the Health Board and merchants other than saloon 
keepers and theater owners. He then left the meeting, followed by five of the six remaining 
clergymen. It was reported that no final agreement could be reached.9
Even the judicial system was affected by the influenza. Many local and county courts 
closed, and more than one judge had a case regarding influenza appear in his courtroom. On 7 
November, fruit stand owner Ruben Myerson, of 311 East Ninth Street, gave John Benjamin, an old 
clothing vendor at 315 East Ninth Street, two black eyes. When the two men appeared in court 
before Judge J. M. Kennedy, Mr. Myerson defended himself saying that Mr. Benjamin was hanging 
around the fruit stand even though Mr. Benjamin had the flu. The judge asked Mr. Benjamin if that 
was true, and when Mr. Benjamin admitted it was, and that he still did not feel well, Judge Kennedy 
dismissed the entire case and had Mr. Benjamin removed.
 
10
                                                          
8 "Grip Cases Yesterday, 107," Kansas City Star, 6 November 1918. 
 
9 "Will Ask Easier Ban," Kansas City Times, 7 November 1918. 
10 "Beat up Influenza Carrier," Kansas City Star, 7 November 
 1918. 
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Mayor Cowgill decided on 8 November to lift the closing ban, expressing unhappiness with 
the Health Board. It was his opinion, he said, that it was unfair to business owners to make them 
close at 4 P.M. This sudden revelation, expressed twenty-two days after he issued the closing 
orders, speaks loudly of political pressure. He ordered the Health Board to meet with him and 
stated: 
The only purpose of closing stores at any certain hour was to prevent congestion of street 
cars, thereby shifting the financial loss from the Metropolitan [Streetcar Company] to the 
merchants. It was an admission of incompetence when health authorities closed stores 
because they could not regulate traffic. If they will adopt my suggestion this afternoon I will 
assure them we can enforce their limit on standing passengers if it takes every patrolman 
on the force.11
This was a rather disingenuous statement since it implied that it was only on the streetcars that 
crowding was a problem. But Mayor Cowgill was not alone in expressing this opinion. Dr. Gannon 
agreed the ban should be lifted. It is hard to understand why Dr. Gannon had such a change of 
heart. At the beginning of the epidemic he was the one urging the city to take action, and now he 
was advocating the opposite. From a medical point of view nothing had changed, so what has 
motivated his actions? It appeared that he was reacting to the political situation and not the 
medical one. It was an easy scapegoat to blame the streetcar company; after all, it was a prominent 
local feature, and it was easy to monitor and control, unlike many hundreds of stores. Additionally, 
earlier he had placed a great deal of blame on the owners for not cooperating with his orders, and 
had wanted to use the police force to ensure cooperation. But Dr. Bullock had refused to take his 
request to the Mayor, so perhaps there was an element of satisfaction in his changed opinion.  
 
 
                                                          
11 "Mayor Will Lift Ban," Kansas City Star, 8 November 1918. 
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 Once again, the School Board disagreed with city officials. When they met on 9 November, 
the Board decided to keep the schools closed. A statement was issued that explained their position; 
physicians had unanimously agreed children should not be exposed to school conditions until there 
was more information on the influenza situation. However, since the city ban was lifted, private 
schools were free to open as they choose.12
Dr. Gannon announced that the case numbers would not be released to the public until the 
end of the day. He felt this action would “…prevent confusing reports of the progress of the 
epidemic.”
  
13 On 10 November Dr. Gannon pronounced that it might take several more weeks for all 
the influenza cases to end, but “the epidemic is broken.”14
                                                          
12 "Schools to Stay Closed," Kansas City Star, 30 November 1918. 
 He remained unhappy with the 
cooperation he had received from some local physicians and the Metropolitan Railway, and it was 
his opinion that the actions of those two groups were responsible for prolonging the outbreak in 
Kansas City. The physicians did not report cases and impose quarantines as they were ordered to 
and the streetcar company offered only “half-hearted” cooperation.  There was no response from 
the local physicians, but James A. Gibson, the streetcar manager, responded that all conductors 
were told to obey the orders of the Health Board, and even though the company had provided 
twenty inspectors to help prevent crowding, it had not been enough. He stated that they had 
requested patrolmen to assist in the effort, but to no avail. Scott A. Godley, the police chief, 
responded to that argument saying it was not the business of the police to monitor streetcars, and 
13 "A Disease Report Censorship," Kansas City Star, 9 November 1918. 
14 "Says Epidemic Is Broken," Kansas City Star, 10 November 1918. 
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there were not enough patrolmen to do it. What had happened in the month since the flu started 
that has so changed the position of all these officials? After all, it was Scott Godley who promised 
Dr. Gannon “I’ll give you all you want”15
Raising funds for the war returned to the forefront on 10 November. Kansas City was 
planning a massive fundraising campaign for thirty-one local charities, and organizers were hoping 
that twenty thousand children would show up to assist in the activities. Parades, breakfasts, 
lunches, and other activities were all part of the plan, and there was little mention of how these 
activities would impact the flu situation.
 on 8 October. But Mr. Motley, Dr. Bullock, and Mr. 
Benjamin all opposed using the police at that time, and so nothing happened. But now, in this 
second ban, Mayor Cowgill told the public he would use the police to enforce the new regulations, 
and yet the police chief said it was not his business. The police chief was an appointee of the 
bosses’, and the Mayor did not seem to have much control over Chief Godley’s actions. 
16 Additional news concerned the churches. Since 10 
November was a Sunday, churches were able to hold indoor services for the first time since 17 
October, although restricted to half-capacity by an order from the Health Board. No problems were 
reported, and parishioners simply sat in every other row.17
Kansas City reacted to the signing of the Armistice on 11 November with the same 
enthusiasm as the rest of the country. The Star reported the streets were filled “…curb to curb with 
 
                                                          
15 "Block Car Crowd Order." 
16 Ibid. 
17 "The Churches Open Again," Kansas City Star, 11 November 1918. 
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excited men and women.”18 Many businesses simply closed; church bells were rung continuously; 
and massive crowds gathered to celebrate the end of the war. By 13 November, Mr. Motley 
recommended that the ban be removed on everything except streetcars and individual houses with 
the disease, on 14 November at noon. Mayor Cowgill approved this idea, and Dr. Bullock concurred. 
The School Board met and decided to reopen the public schools on Monday, 18 November; they 
had been closed since 8 October.19 There was no mention of consultation with the Health Board, or 
physicians at General Hospital. And on 14 November, just as reported, the Mayor lifted the ban, 
only requesting that the streetcars prevent “extreme crowding.”20
Miss Ida Irmas, the registrar at vital statistics, reported a “normal” death rate for the week 
on 15 November.
 
21  Dr. Gannon was quoted on 18 November, reassuring the public and offering his 
opinion that since cases were holding steady, at the first sign of favorable weather the epidemic 
should end.22 But on 19 November, Lieutenant Colonel G. M. Magruder, of the U.S. Public Health 
Services, proposed to the Mayor and the Health Board a plan by which two public health officials 
would be assigned to coordinate and cooperate with the health authorities of Greater Kansas City, 
on both the Missouri and Kansas side, on “health measures and problems.”23
                                                          
18 "In a Wild Demonstration," Kansas City Star, 11 November 1918. 
  The Colonel had been 
19 "Will Open Schools Monday," Kansas City Star, 13 November 1918. 
20 "Ends the Influenza Ban," Kansas City Star, 14 November 1918. 
21 "Report 36 Influenza Cases," Kansas City Star, 15 November 1918. 
22 "Influenza in Last Stage," Kansas City Star, 18 November 1918. 
23"U.S. As Health Supervisor," Kansas City Star, 19 November 1918. 
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in both cities for several days and had already spoken to Kansas officials about the idea. No decision 
was made on the proposal, and there was no mention of what prompted this proposal.  
As the epidemic continued on, fraternal insurance and beneficial organizations were 
impacted heavily by losses. One fraternal organization, the Modern Woodsman of America, had 
reported 920 death claims in April 1918 worth a total of $1,550,660. That was the largest number 
of claims ever experienced, until November of 1918, when there were 1, 329 deaths from influenza 
and pneumonia worth $2,982,750.24 The National Life Insurance Company noted that between 
paying claims for war and influenza, claims were up 21 percent. The Annual Report, issued in 
January 1919, stated “In 1918 life insurance was subjected to the severest test ever imposed on the 
business in a single year.”25
Influenza cases continued to be reported, ranging between forty and sixty, for the next few 
days. On 26 November, there was a sudden increase in cases to 157. Dr. Bullock attributed the rise 
to cases among schoolchildren, and maintained that it could be controlled simply by closing 
individual schools where the cases occurred.
 
26
Previously, on 21 October, Dr. Gannon had visited the McClure Flats area and vowed to 
have them torn down. Dr. Bullock returned to inspect McClure Flats on 26 November with a fire 
and building inspector from the city, and an order was issued that they were “unfit for human 
   
                                                          
24 "The M.W.A. Claims Heavy," Kansas City Star, 26 November 1918. 
25 "National Life Insurance Company",  http://www.nationallife.com/public/histarchive/events_flu.asp 
(accessed 20 February 2010). 
26 "Increase in Influenza," Kansas City Star, 26 November 1918. 
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habitation.”27 Tenants were supposed to have thirty days to leave, but the realty company that 
owned the Flats was promising to repair them, so the city building inspector put a hold on the 
order.28
On 27 November, the Health Board met in a secret session at Mayor Cowgills’ office, and 
afterward announced that Dr. A. J. Gannon was fired. Dr. Gannon did not attend the meeting, and 
all other members of the board refused to speak about the decision. All questions were referred to 
Mr. Motley, and his only response was “…it was for the good of the service….”
 
29 The paper made 
note of the fact that secret sessions of city boards, especially the Health Board, had been used 
frequently in the past. The reader might remember that this current Health Board had come into 
being in the same manner, and that the Jackson County Medical Society had protested the 
appointment and dismissal of the previous Board. The Society may have felt the same way about 
this decision, but unfortunately, the Jackson County Medical Society Bulletin had stopped 
publication in the spring of 1918, and did not resume publication until 11 January 1919, so there 
was no record of any protest. In February of 1919, they published another editorial criticizing the 
political makeup of the Health Department,30
                                                          
27 "Must Vacate Mcclure Flats." 
 but they did not specifically mention Dr. Gannon. His 
firing may be attributed to the many disagreements between Mr. Motley and the doctor. They 
argued over using the police, establishment of quarantine, instituting a ban on meetings, and 
28 Ibid. 
29 "Health Board Drops Gannon," Kansas City Star, 27 November 1918. 
30 Jackson County Medical Society (Mo.), "Editorial," Weekly Bulletin of the Jackson County Medical Society 
13, no. 5 (1919): 34. 
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releasing the numbers of cases during the day. The newspaper speculated along the same lines. 
There was political fallout after this decision however, as H. L. Benjamin, a Republican Health Board 
member, resigned on Saturday 30 November.31
Once again, at the end of November, cases increased again, and Mr. Motley placed the 
blame on physicians, arguing that they are too relaxed about reporting cases. “Laxity of physicians 
in reporting cases to us is the sole and only reason for this new outbreak of the epidemic.”
 Mr. Benjamin cited political interference as the 
reason for the resignation. 
32
Health officials took care to note that while cases were increasing, the severity of the cases 
seemed to be decreasing. Deaths were not as high as previously, and officials were hopeful that this 
 While 
no one was quoted as questioning this line of reasoning, in fairness to the local physicians it must 
be pointed out that reporting a case had no effect on the spread of the epidemic. If Mr. Motley 
blamed the physicians for finding a case and then not quarantining that case, he would have had a 
valid argument, but he was making the argument that the increasing number of cases was due to 
physicians “catching up” on the reporting paperwork. Cases had been ranging from forty to sixty a 
day for several weeks, and then on 26 November there were 157 cases, 191 cases on 27 November, 
and 67 cases on 28 November, as of noon. It was true that those days were over the Thanksgiving 
holiday, and perhaps doctors were using the holiday to catch up, but it was unlikely that the cases 
would triple solely due to record keeping.  
                                                          
31 "Hold Secret Health Meeting," Kansas City Star, 3 December 1918. 
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trend indicated a milder form of the disease.33 On 30 November Dr. Bullock ordered the public 
schools “…remain closed until further orders.”34
As the city continued to deal with what they were calling the “second epidemic,” statistics 
support the contention of health officials that it was milder. While 333 cases were reported in a 
twenty-four hour period on 2 December, only eight deaths occurred in the same time.
 The wording of “remain closed” was puzzling, since 
they had re-opened on 18 November, and Dr. Bullock had mentioned on 26 November that schools 
were open and some had many cases. So why was he saying “remain closed” when they were 
open? One hypothesis was that he was referring to the Thanksgiving holiday that had just passed; 
the schools would have been closed for the holiday. Additionally, Dr. Bullock seemed to have 
become more cautious after the firing of Dr. Gannon, and perhaps his personal brush with the flu. 
On 26 November he had argued that there was only a need to close the schools that had cases, and 
now he was closing all of them. Closing the schools did not really impact businesses in the same 
manner as reducing business hours; this was a safe political and public health decision. 
35 But once 
again General Hospital was full with ninety influenza patients, and officials discussed (once again) 
opening other floors.36
                                                          
33 "Influenza Losing Force," Kansas City Star, 29 November 1918. 
 On the Kansas side cases increased again, and this time, disputes emerged. 
Dr. M.L. Moulder was in charge of Bethany Hospital on the Kansas side, and he wanted the city to 
take steps to curb the disease as his hospital was full. Dr. McLaughlin, the city health officer, 
34 "Schools to Stay Closed." Kansas City Star, 30 November 1918. 
35 "Few Influenza Deaths," Kansas City Star, 1 December 1918. 
36 "The Epidemic Test Tomorrow," Kansas City Star, 2 December 1918. 
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recommended closing the schools, but this time the public school heads objected. It was their 
opinion that everything should be closed, not just the schools.37 On 3 December the city 
commissioners on the Kansas side closed the schools, restricted crowding of theaters and 
prohibited children under sixteen from access. Dr. McLaughlin wanted a tougher ban, but he was 
overruled.38
The advisory body of General Hospital physicians, which had been named by Mayor Cowgill 
on 17 October, reacted to the Mayor’s decision to ignore their advice on 3 December. They met 
publically at General Hospital and “severely criticized” the Mayor and Health Board for removing 
the ban against their advice and for the handling of the epidemic.
 
39 Dr. McCallum stated, “You 
asked for our aid and then ignored us when you decided to lift the ban.”40 It was a very heated 
meeting; Mr. Motley was present but left after the advisory board adopted a resolution releasing 
the board from any further service. In the beginning, he defended the actions of the city, but after 
Dr. Jackson said “not a single physician of this staff told you that [conditions had improved], and in 
fact, we advised you not to try to lift the ban but to adopt stronger measures,”41
                                                          
37 "No Kansas Side Decision," Kansas City Star, 2 December 1918. 
 suddenly Mr. 
Motley felt it was time to blame the Mayor, saying he was the one who lifted the ban. Also present 
38 "Close Kansas Side Schools," Kansas City Star, 3 December 1918. 
39 "Health Committee Out," Kansas City Star, 3 December 1918. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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was Dr. Maclay Lyon, the former medical inspector for the schools, who had replaced Dr. Gannon 
as chief of contagious diseases, and he offered his opinion that the epidemic was waning.42
Health authorities were aware that statistics on the number of cases each day were not 
really very meaningful, as they could be widely inaccurate. The death reports, however, had to be 
officially recorded, and so those numbers should give a fairly accurate portrayal of what was 
occurring, although there could still be a time lag between the death and the burial. Dr. Bullock 
attempted to explain this situation to the reporters on 4 December, defending his contention that 
the epidemic was at a standstill with 397 cases and twenty deaths in the last twenty-four hours.
 
43 
The Kansas side was also defending its actions in the face of rising numbers of cases and deaths; J.B. 
Brown, the commissioner for health and parks, offered that the partial quarantine of children 
should be enough, and stated they would evaluate the situation again on Friday 6 December.44
Once again the actions of B. A. Parsons, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, 
resulted in action from the city. On 5 December, there was a meeting of Mayor Cowgill, Dr. Bullock, 
and Mr. Parsons. As a result of the meeting, Dr. Bullock telegraphed the Surgeon General of the 
United States, Dr. Rupert Blue, for help in the epidemic.
 
45
                                                          
42 Ibid. 
  (See appendix f for a copy of the 
telegram.) Since earlier, on 19 November, Colonel McGruder had offered the assistance of the U.S. 
Public Health Service, Dr. Bullock also requested the Colonel press the Surgeon General to approve 
43 "Epidemic at the Peak," Kansas City Star, 4 December 1918. 
44 "Will Test Part Quarantine," Kansas City Star, 4 December 1918. 
45 "Call U.S. On Influenza," Kansas City Star, 5 December 1918. 
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the request. In a surprise move, Dr. Bullock offered his written retirement to the Hospital and 
Health Board that same day for his position as superintendent of General Hospital, while stating he 
would remain as the Health Director. Mayor Cowgill received a copy of the letter. Dr. Bullock 
offered that his own recent attack of influenza and the current epidemic had “…been responsible 
for his desire to be relieved of the superintendency….,”46
On 6 December, the Kansas City Star congratulated Mayor Cowgill for calling in public 
health experts. The Kansas City Journal seemed to feel that this action was the only plan that could 
deal with the situation: 
 and additionally he needed more time for 
his other duties as Health Director. He offered to stay in both positions until a replacement was 
named. 
The utter futility of the present hospital and health board coping with the influenza 
epidemic so long as it is a politically controlled body and forced to accept the dictates of 
political bosses was tacitly admitted yesterday by E.H. Bullock, who had just presented his 
resignation as superintendent of General Hospital, urged that the United States public 
health service be asked to send representatives to Kansas City and stamp out the 
epidemic.47
New York City was cited as an example of the excellent work that Surgeon General Blue had 
achieved. Strict personal quarantine rather than a general ban was mentioned as the key to the 
success there. The article did suggest “the sensible course now is to….call in experts,…and then 
follow their advice.”
 
 
48
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
 Meanwhile, the Mayor refused a request from “a certain class of professional 
47 "Political Health Board Breaks in Epidemic Crisis," Kansas City Journal, 6 December 1918. 
48 "To Check the Epidemic," Kansas City Star, 6 December 1918. 
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men”49
Dr. Bullock continued to offer a positive outlook on the health situation on 6 December. It 
was his opinion that “unquestionable improvement”
 to convene a meeting of local civic and business leaders to discuss the health situation. The 
Mayor offered that there was no point since the only option was a ban on business and he would 
not authorize that. He intended to wait for federal help. There was no explanation of who the class 
of professional men might have been; although perhaps it was the same activists that were led by 
B. A. Parsons. 
50 had occurred, although “the situation is 
indeed serious.”51 He recommended soda and water as a preventative, along with cleanliness and 
avoidance of crowds.52  Cases of influenza ranged from over 200 to as high as 401 in the first five 
days of December, and deaths from pneumonia and influenza over that period were 118.53 The 
Kansas side health commissioner, Dr. McLaughlin, recommended stronger measures, as cases 
continued to increase in Kansas.54 General Hospital requested nurses from the Red Cross, but none 
were available. Black nurses trained by Dr. William J. Thompkins, superintendent of Colored 
Hospital #2, volunteered to care for white patients at General Hospital, and their offer was 
accepted – showing the desperation of health officials.55
                                                          
49 "Wait on Federal Advice," Kansas City Star, 6 December 1918. 
 The board of education announced that 
50 "Decline in Influenza," Kansas City Star, 6 December 1918. 
51 Ibid. 
52 "Soda the Best Preventative," Kansas City Star, 6 December 1918. 
53 "Decline in Influenza." 
54 "Discuss a Kansas Side Order," Kansas City Star, 6 December 1918. 
55 "Better Epidemic Report," Kansas City Star, 6 December 1918. 
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schools would remain closed until 30 December, on the recommendation of Dr. Bullock.56 The 
University of Missouri at Columbia announced that they were closing at the direction of the local 
health board until January. With the exception of the Students’ Army Training corps, all 2500 
students were sent home.57
On 7 December, Dr. Bullock joined the effort to improve sanitation in the city. John W. 
Parker, the superintendent of the sanitary division, and Dr. Bullock personally inspected the 
stockyards. He ordered the Kansas City Stock Yards Company to begin an immediate cleanup. In the 
letter Dr. Bullock sent to the owners of the company, he noted surprise that “such a large 
corporation would permit such conditions to exist….”,
 
58 and stated that the people of Kansas City 
trusted him to protect their health and he intended to do just that. Additionally, he pointed out 
that many complaints had been received about the filthy conditions by both live stock shippers and 
commissioners. The city got a response from Surgeon General Blue on 7 December, directing them 
to request aid from Surgeon Bahrenburg of the St. Louis Marine Hospital. Dr. Bullock complied with 
that request and contacted Dr. Bahrenburg by telegram. In his assessment to the doctor he 
described the situation as “stationary.”59
                                                          
56 "Schools to Open December 30," Kansas City Star, 6 December  
 Mayor Cowgill named Dr. A. W. Thompson, current 
president of the Welfare Board, to replace Dr. Bullock as head of General Hospital. The 
 1918. 
57 "Grip Closes Missouri U.," Kansas City Star, 6 December 1918. 
58 "Must Clean Stock Yards," Kansas City Star, 7 December 1918. 
59 "Epidemic at a Standstill," Kansas City Star, 7 December 1918. 
90 
 
appointment was to be effective on Monday 9 December, after the meeting of the Health Board. 
Dr. Thompson was described as “…a Democrat and is known as a personal friend of Mayor 
Cowgill.”60
In related news on 7 December, Dr. Bullock received a bill of $3339.20 from Major D.D. 
Dutton, the local director of the Red Cross. The bill was for reimbursement of the Red Cross for 
“…equipment and nurses’ salaries….”
 
61
The bill rendered the city by the Kansas City Chapter of the American Red Cross for 
$3339.20 has been withdrawn. The greater portion of the bill was for medical supplies and 
hospital equipment which the hospital department of the city retained and is now using. 
But, inasmuch as there has been a misunderstanding, the directors of the local Red Cross 
have ordered the bill withdrawn. The Red Cross has deemed it a privilege to have been 
permitted to assist the health board in this emergency.
 Major Dutton reminded Dr. Bullock that he had stated early 
in the epidemic that the Health Board would repay the Red Cross, although Dr. Bullock stated he 
had no memory of that and he did not have the authority to authorize payment. On 12 December, 
however, Major Dutton formally withdrew the request for payment from the city, citing a 
misunderstanding. The formal statement reads as follows:  
62
It seemed that neither party in the misunderstanding really wanted to fight, and so in the interest 
of maintaining good relations with the city, the Red Cross simply decided to ignore the incident. 
  
 
 For the next few days, the reported cases continued to be high, and on 9 December, Kansas 
City recorded the highest number of deaths from influenza and pneumonia, thirty-eight, thus far in 
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the epidemic.63 On the Kansas side, health commissioner J. B. Brown stated that he would request 
Major Bahrenburg to take control of the epidemic on the Kansas side as well.64
 Major L.P. H. Bahrenburg arrived in Kansas City on Saturday 8 December as a guest of Dr. 
George C. Mosher, the head of the State Council of Defense, Medical Section. He would only be in 
town one night, but he had a busy schedule.
 He seemed to 
understand that banning an activity on one side and not on the other just meant that the activity 
was going to move to where it was allowed, thus increasing the chances for spread of the disease. 
65  He planned to review the records of the epidemic 
since it began, and attend a conference at the Hotel Baltimore with the Mayor, Dr. Bullock, B. A. 
Parsons, Dr. Mosher, and other interested parties to discuss the measures that he felt would be 
necessary to stop the epidemic in Kansas City. The major planned to institute a strict quarantine of 
houses, rather than a general ban. (See appendix f for the complete list of recommendations.) 
Major Bahrenburg was a firm believer in the germ theory, and he offered the public an explanation 
of how germs were spread. His explanation was that influenza was carried by droplets, and that 
when a person sneezed, there was “…a sneeze zone…”66
 On the very same day that the paper printed Major Bahrenburg’s explanation of the germ 
theory, they also printed an article from Dr. Katharine Richardson of Mercy Hospital. Dr. Richardson 
 of about three feet that should be 
avoided. 
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was one of the few woman doctors in town and it was her belief that the epidemic was not 
influenza, but a new disease caused by some unknown poison.67 Her theory would fit in with the 
chemical theory of disease. She offered as her evidence that the disease seemed to attack the 
nerve centers, deaths did not have symptoms of pneumonia, and that in treating forty patients, 
they only had one death. However, the treatments she was recommending did not seem to be 
much different than what other doctors of the day were advocating; frequent bathing and keep the 
bowels moving.68
 Major Bahrenburg sent Kansas City a telegram on 10 December. He assigned Dr. B. A. 
Wilkes to come to town and take charge. Dr. Wilkes was described as “…an excellent organizer and 
executive,”
 
69
Kansas City reached another unwanted record on 10 December, recording fifty-nine 
influenza and pneumonia deaths, an additional twenty-one from other causes, for eighty deaths, 
the highest ever recorded in Kansas City up to that date.
 who had had a good record dealing with influenza in Washington. Dr. Bullock was on 
his way to Chicago, in order to attend a conference of the National Health Society. The Society was 
attempting consensus for uniform treatment guidelines for influenza and its complications. Both 
Mayor Cowgill and Major Bahrenburg had encouraged Dr. Bullock to attend the conference.  
70
                                                          
67 "Not Influenza Epidemic?," Kansas City Star, 9 December 1918. 
 Mayor Cowgill was eagerly anticipating 
the assistance of Dr. Wilkes, as the membership of the Health Board was much decreased. H. L. 
68 Ibid. 
69 "Low Influenza Record," Kansas City Star, 10 December 1918. 
70 "In One Day, 80 Deaths," Kansas City Star, 10 December 1918. 
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Benjamin, the Republican member, had resigned, citing political pressure. The Democratic member, 
B. L. Hart, had suffered a fall and was unable to leave his house. Dr. Bullock was away, and Dr. 
Maclay Lyon, temporarily appointed head of contagious diseases, could only work part time since 
he still retained his position as the head of school medical inspections. Dr. A. W. Thompson, new 
head of General Hospital was in the same situation as Dr. Lyon, with a second job as head of the 
Welfare Board. The staff physicians at General Hospital had refused to advise the city any further, 
and so W. P. Motley, the chairman, was all that was left. However, Mr. Motley wanted to resign, 
and was only remaining under pressure from the Mayor.71
 The Kansas side was not exempt from controversy as the epidemic continued. J. B. Brown, 
commissioner of city parks and health, brought charges against Dr. C. W. McLaughlin, city health 
officer, to the civil service commission. He accused Dr. McLaughlin of ignoring his city duties to 
focus on his private practice, of not enforcing city ordinances, of not obeying Mr. Brown’s order to 
work at least five hours daily at city hall, and a myriad of other charges pertaining to the handling of 
the epidemic.
  
72 Mr. Brown intended to suspend Dr. McLaughlin as soon as a trial date was set by 
the civil service commission. Additionally, Mr. Brown announced that even if Dr. Wilkes was not 
officially put in charge of the epidemic in Kansas, he intended to follow whatever recommendations 
were adopted on the Missouri side.73
                                                          
71 "Hope When U.S. Steps In," Kansas City Star, 10 December 1918. 
 
72 "Would Oust Health Head," Kansas City Star, 10 December 1918. 
73 "Will Obey the Federal Rules," Kansas City Star, 10 December 1918. 
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 Both Dr. Bullock and Dr. J. S. Crumbine, Kansas State Board of Health, reported back from 
the conference on 11 December. Dr. Crumbine was most impressed with a vaccine that was 
developed by Dr. Edward C. Rosenow, of the Mayo Clinic. Although not all the tests of the vaccine 
had been positive, Dr. Crumbine felt a vaccine was really the only thing to offer. He intended to 
send someone from the University of Kansas to work with Dr. Rosenow and learn how the vaccine 
was made and then return to Kansas and replicate the attempt. Dr. Bullock was hopeful that Kansas 
City might be able to purchase the vaccine from Kansas, if funds could be found.74
 On Wednesday 11 December, Kansas Citians faced another problem; the streetcar union 
had gone on strike at four that morning. The union workers struck after they were notified that 
streetcar President P. J. Kealy did not plan to follow the ruling of the War Labor Board and increase 
their wages.
 
75 Riders of the railway, however, had dealt with this problem many times in the past, 
and most businesses simply sent out delivery trucks to pick up workers. Others used foot power, 
horse power, or resorted to hailing cars that passed by. Dr. Wilkes, who had just arrived in the city 
from St. Louis, actually cited the strike as a “great benefit,” and believed it would help with the 
influenza situation.76
                                                          
74 "Would Try Vaccine Here," Kansas City Star, 11 December 1918. 
 Dr. Wilkes planned to wait for the return of Dr. Bullock from the conference 
before he announced any detailed plans, but he stated, “A general ban is not necessary by any 
means, nor is it necessary to hamper the business life of the city while conducting a health 
75 "Cars Stay in Barns," Kansas City Star, 11 December 1918. 
76 "Says a Ban Won't Help," Kansas City Star, 11 December 1918. 
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campaign.”77 Additionally, he stated that the city could not succeed without the co-operation of 
every citizen, a strict enforcement of individual quarantines, and that the schools must remain 
closed.78  Dr. Bullock was not scheduled to return until 13 December.79 General Hospital was 
experiencing a severe shortage of physicians; it was announced that Dr. B. E. Colby, the assistant 
superintendent, was down with the flu.80
 When the Chicago conference of the American Public Health Association wrapped up, the 
only recommendation that could be agreed upon by the more than one thousand health experts 
was for preventative inoculation.
 
81  Local health officials in Chicago were using the Rosenow 
method and Dr. J. D. Robertson, the health commissioner, offered Dr. Bullock the loan of Dr. F. C. 
Tonney, the pathologist in charge of making the vaccine for Chicago, to start the process in Kansas 
City. Dr. Bullock was non-committal, but back in Kansas City Dr. Wilkes was advocating inoculation 
as the “…the best means we have of fighting the disease,”82
                                                          
77 Ibid. 
 and stating that he hoped Dr. Bullock 
would return with some serum. 
78 "Dally with an Epidemic." 
79 "Epidemic Report Better," Kansas City Star, 11 December 1918. 
80 "Dr. B.E. Colby Has Influenza," Kansas City Star, 11 December 1918. 
81 "Offer Serum Expert Here," Kansas City Star, 12 December 1918. 
82 "Will Urge Serum Stations," Kansas City Star, 12 December 1918. 
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CHAPTER 5 
“MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFLUENZA IS VERY VAGUE…”1
In 1918, there were many factors working against health officials. The lack of knowledge, 
the shortages of material and personnel due to the war, and the primitive state of public health in 
the United States all contributed to a less than stellar response. Even access to health reports was 
not a speedy proposition. On 13 December, the state of Missouri published the death statistics for 
October. Missouri had suffered 3,145 deaths from influenza, 1,336 from pneumonia, for a total of 
4,481 deaths. Kansas City had experienced 656 deaths, and St. Louis had 724 during the same 
period.
 
2 The numbers were for October; all officials were expecting the numbers to be much higher 
in November. And after three months of experience with this flu, medical experts were still unsure 
about many things. Some experts believed that the influenza itself did not kill patients; it simply 
weakened them and they died of pneumonia. Colonel Victor C. Vaughn was quoted, “We can’t 
study influenza because our patients die of pneumonia and other diseases.”3
The first rule that Dr. Wilkes and Dr. Bullock instituted on 13 December was to prohibit 
attendance at church, school, or theaters by children under sixteen. Also, if a patron should 
 Experts were still 
arguing over how influenza was spread; two popular theories were by droplet spread, and by 
contact with bodily wastes. 
                                                          
1 "Epidemic on the Wane?." 
2 "Influenza Deaths in Missouri, 4,481," Kansas City Star, 13 December 1918. 
3 "Sleep a Foe to Influenza," Kansas City Star, 13 December 1918. 
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suddenly start sneezing or coughing, they would be asked to leave.4
That the serum could be made in Kansas City is true. Dr. J. D. Roberson, health 
commissioner of Chicago, offered to lend one of his assistants to Kansas City, sending us 
the man who made the vaccines for Chicago. But we do not have the equipment and I do 
not feel justified in planning such a movement when I am not convinced of its value.
 But the two men appear to 
have had their first disagreement that same day. Dr. Wilkes had been hopeful that Dr. Bullock 
would return to Kansas City with serum in order that mass inoculations could be carried out. Dr. 
Bullock stated his opinion that inoculations may or may not be of value, but that the best treatment 
for influenza had to be individualized for each patient. He felt that mass inoculations would be of 
limited value. He was quoted: 
5
Dr. Wilkes was not quoted as responding to these statements, but he must have wondered 
whether he was really in charge in Kansas City. 
 
 
On the Kansas side, children had been banned from theaters since 3 December. But while 
Kansas might have been more proactive with public health measures, they were also having 
internal difficulties. J. B. Brown, commissioner of health, insisted that Dr. McLaughlin, the city 
health officer, be suspended. Dr. McLaughlin, however, was showing up to work each day and 
stating that he “…was still on the job.”6
On 14 December, health officials were optimistic that the drop in cases would continue. As 
evidence, they cited the weekly totals of cases for the past two weeks. There were 1,902 cases the 
 
                                                          
4 "Bar Children under 16," Kansas City Star, December 13 1918. 
5 "Won't Use Serum Here." 
6 "Has City a Health Officer?." 
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first week of December, and only 1,205 the second week.7 Dr. Wilkes planned a meeting for all 
interested physicians at eight in the evening at General Hospital to discuss influenza. Perhaps the 
most hopeful news was that physicians at the University of Missouri had developed a vaccine and 
they planned to make it available free of charge to registered physicians through the state board of 
health. The Dean of the School of Medicine, Dr. Guy L. Noyes, offered his facilities and personnel to 
Kansas City. The school had produced only limited quantities of the vaccine thus far, but Dean 
Noyes welcomed any physician from Kansas City who cared to come and learn how to produce the 
vaccine.8
At the general meeting of physicians on 14 December with Dr. Wilkes, there was 
agreement that the epidemic was almost over. They based their assessment on the history of the 
epidemic in other cities. In all cities there were two waves, and the second wave was the last.
 
9  Dr. 
Wilkes noted, “The disease has taken a much milder form here in Kansas City. However, there have 
been a slightly greater number of deaths from pneumonia complications, the reason for which I 
cannot point out.”10 Local physicians at the meeting blamed the local hospitals; they felt the 
hospitals had not cooperated by accepting as many patients as possible, and that was the reason 
for the higher deaths here.11
                                                          
7 "Disease in Big Decline." 
 J. B. Brown, park and health commissioner in Kansas, offered that 
8 "Missouri Has a Vaccine." 
9 "The Epidemic Is Passing." 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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Kansas was adopting every rule that Dr. Wilkes adopted in Kansas City, but as yet there has been 
only a small decline in cases.12
In fact, the physicians at the meeting based their assessment on a faulty knowledge of 
history of prior epidemics of influenza. At the national conference in Chicago that Dr. Bullock had 
attended, it was made very clear that influenza occurred in waves and that more illness should be 
expected. Dr. R. A. O’Neill was the chairman of the Illinois Influenza Commission, and he proposed: 
 
The fight must continue day by day and the medical profession must prepare in times 
between waves for the next succeeding wave. Every city should establish reserve forces of 
nurses and physicians and should make provision for increased hospital space. The 
epidemic is not going to stop with the present recurrence nor with the next one.13
Did Dr. Bullock not hear these remarks? Or did he not attend the local meeting with Dr. Wilkes? Or 
did he simply dismiss that information as he had dismissed the consensus opinion of the value of 
inoculations? There was a clue to Dr. Bullock’s attitude on 16 December. When discussing the 
tendency of influenza to occur in waves he stated “…medical knowledge of influenza is very 
vague.”
 
 
14 Whatever the answer, it seems as if the physicians in Kansas City were working under a 
false assumption that this wave of flu would be the last. It was equally clear that Kansas was not 
working on that same assessment, however. Dr. Crumbine of the Kansas State Board of Health was 
finalizing plans for the manufacture of serum in Kansas, creating a reserve force of nurses and 
physicians, and assessing the hospital spaces in Kansas.15
                                                          
12 "Decrease on Kansas Side." 
 
13 "The Influenza in Waves," Kansas City Star, 15 December 1918. 
14 "Epidemic on the Wane?." 
15 "The Influenza in Waves." 
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 Dr. Bullock and Dr. Wilkes imposed further restrictions on the sixteenth. This time the focus 
was saloons; “loitering and congregating”16 were forbidden. The police were notified of the order 
and inspectors were to go out to the saloons to determine if the order was being obeyed. 
Additionally, children under sixteen were forbidden from crowds and stores.17 Dr. Bullock was 
forecasting the removal of all restrictions in the next few days, but only if everyone would co-
operate with the rules. Dr. Wilkes announced that he would return to St. Louis on 18 December, 
since “…the epidemic is under control.”18  Cases continued to decrease in the next two days, but Dr. 
Bullock reminded the public to remain vigilant. On 19 December, the nearby city of Independence 
announced the removal of the restrictions on public gatherings; there had been a ban in place for 
three weeks there.19
If that is the attitude the people of Kansas City take, if they do not want protection and are 
not anxious to do away with influenza, the health department will be forced to abandon its 
campaign to prevent influenza and fight the disease only after persons have contracted it.
 Independence school officials decided to keep the schools closed until 30 
December. On the twentieth, the Kansas City health inspectors reported that many stores were 
ignoring the ban on children; Dr. Bullock chastised the parents for endangering their children, and 
warned the public that there would be consequences: 
20
                                                          
16 "Restrict Crowds in Saloons," Kansas City Star, 16 December 1918. 
  
 
17 "Epidemic under Control." 
18 "Epidemic under Control?." 
19 "Will Lift Independence Ban." 
20 "Disregard a Health Rule," Kansas City Star, 20 December 1918. 
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This was not the first time that Dr. Bullock had blamed citizen, merchant, or physician behavior for 
prolonging the epidemic. In this case, how were stores to determine if someone was under sixteen? 
It would not be practical to station an employee at every entrance to every store. And in 1918 there 
was no mass method of proving your age. Driver’s licenses were issued in Missouri as early as 1903, 
but no age limits were in place.21
 As of 23 December, it was a moot point; Dr. Bullock announced that all restrictions on 
public life were ended that day.
 There was no practical way to enforce the ban, and it was even 
more impractical to expect sixteen year olds to self-police. 
22 He cautioned the public to continue to stay out of crowds and 
stay home if they were ill. Additionally, he mentioned that cases would probably increase after the 
holiday gatherings, but that would be a normal occurrence and not signal the return of the 
epidemic. On the Kansas side restrictions were still in place. Other news on that day concerned the 
Board of Health meeting; it was cancelled since the only two remaining members, W. P Motley and 
B. L. Hart were unable to attend. Mr. Hart remained at home recovering from a fall, and Mr. Motley 
had a “severe cold.”23 By 26 December, influenza had receded to the background, and the big news 
of the day was that shoppers had spent “lavishly” for Christmas this year, despite the streetcar 
strike, a major snowstorm, and influenza.24
                                                          
21 Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics Summary to 19951995. 
  
22 "Lift the Influenza Ban." 
23 "No Health Board Meeting Today," Kansas City Star, 23 December 1918. 
24 "Set New Sales Record." 
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Before the year’s end the status of Dr. McLaughlin, the Kansas side city health officer, was 
settled. It was not good news for Dr. McLaughlin, as the civil service board dismissed him as 
“…incompetent to cope with the influenza epidemic…”25
 In this microhistory, I have examined the decisions that the politicians and political 
appointees made as it applied to the influenza situation. I would like to now consolidate my 
evidence as it applied to each person, in order to better understand why they acted as they did. 
Each member of the Board of Health was an individual, and able to make decisions based on the 
facts. However, I believe the evidence has shown that in Kansas City politicians had to please the 
political bosses, rather than the citizens. The Democratic machine, controlled most powerfully by 
Tom Pendergast and Joe Shannon, was the real power behind any decision the city made. Everyone 
from the bosses to the public understood the system, and it was that system that was really 
responsible for Kansas City’s high death rate. 
 Dr. Farquhard Campbell was selected as 
his replacement. The month of December closed with the health situation stable enough that all 
the schools on both sides of the state line planned to reopen on 30 December. 
 Mayor Cowgill was in a tough situation when the epidemic came to Kansas City. He was the 
compromise candidate that both Shannon and Pendergast could agree to support. They only 
agreed on him after they had lost the office of Mayor in 1916 when George Edwards, a Republican, 
won. Rather than face splitting the Democratic vote once again and taking a chance that Edwards 
would again win, they both agreed to support Cowgill. Kansas City has elected Democrats for 
                                                          
25 "New Kansas Side Health Head," Kansas City Star, December 24 1918. 
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Mayor from 1918 to the present, with only two exceptions.26
The first instance in which the Mayor was consulted occurred on 6 October, when Dr. 
Gannon called on the Mayor to declare an emergency. It was not surprising that the Mayor did not 
act; Dr. Bullock, the head of the Health and Hospital Board insisted there was no danger yet.
 So if the two most powerful 
Democrats picked a candidate, there was very little doubt that candidate would win.  
27 But 
by the next day, with the backing of the Chamber of Commerce, the Red Cross, the Hospital and 
Health Board, the Mayor issued the first public order consisting of restrictions on crowds over 
twenty persons, although any war related activities were exempt.28 Mayor Cowgill approved lifting 
the ban on 14 October,29 although it was clear that the action was not universally approved. By 17 
October, the Chamber of Commerce was again urging action, and this time the Mayor consulted 
with the physicians at General Hospital.30 On 18 October, the Mayor issued sweeping orders closing 
all public gatherings that were not essential to war work, along with other regulations that had 
been proposed by the staff of General Hospital. But it is on that same day that the Mayor also 
approved letting the Soil Products Exhibit open.31
                                                          
26 Wikipedia contributors, "List of Mayors of Kansas City, Missouri", Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_mayors_of_Kansas_City,_Missouri&oldid=333452498 
(accessed 10 February 2010). 
 For the Mayor to even consider exempting this 
event demonstrates just how much influence the business community held. The proclamation 
27 "Dally with an Epidemic." 
28 "Mr. Parsons Got Quick Action." 
29 "Lift Ban under Protest." 
30 "Set New Sales Record." 
31 "Show May Open Tonight." 
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(appendix b) and regulations (appendix c) make it quite clear that this was a serious situation and 
the precautions were necessary. The only loss in closing the Exhibits was financial, and even though 
the Chamber of Commerce supported closing the Exhibit, this seemed to be a political decision.  
The Mayor’s next action was to decline to make any decision on lifting the ban without the 
approval of the physicians at General Hospital. However, he facilitated theater owners and other 
unhappy businessmen in presenting their arguments to the Health and Hospital Board.32 The Mayor 
enjoyed political cover when he stated that he was following the physicians’ orders, but his next 
decision on 8 November to lift the ban without consultation with anyone speaks loudly of how 
much political pressure he was under to let businesses re-open.33 He accused the Hospital and 
Health Board of “…incompetence…,”34 and stated he was correcting their mistakes by letting 
businesses re-open, and forcing the Metropolitan Railway to reduce crowding. It is much easier to 
deal with the angry owner of one business, than many angry owners of many businesses, even 
when that one owner was a powerful Democrat. The Mayor would have no further direct action in 
the influenza outbreak, although he issued a call for assistance to the Surgeon General. Surgeon 
General Blue was well known for his feeling that quarantines were not effective; in his list of 
recommendations published on 14 September  he wrote, “quarantine: None; impracticable.” 35
                                                          
32 "Seek to Tilt Grip Lid." 
 
There was little chance that someone sent by the Surgeon General would go against his advice. 
33 "Mayor Will Lift Ban." 
34 Ibid. 
35 "Fear Epidemic of Spanish Influenza," Kansas City Star, 14 September 1918. 
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Dr. Bullock, head of General Hospital and Health Director, was featured in almost every 
decision that was made. It would be tedious to recount all his decisions, but his actions can be 
examined by selecting a few of them. Dr. Bullock’s first decision was to downplay the seriousness of 
situation.36 He was urged to do something by Dr. Gannon, and he thwarted many of Dr. Gannon’s 
requests for stronger action. It was difficult to determine if he was reacting to a less than cordial 
relationship with Dr. Gannon, or if he simply believed quarantine measures were ineffective. 
Another possibility was that Dr. Bullock and Dr. Gannon were appointed by different political 
bosses. The practice in 1918 was to divide the city departments in half; half the appointees were 
made by Pendergast, and the other half were made by Shannon.37 Records do not exist that could 
answer that question. Whatever their personal relationship, it was clear their professional 
relationship was marred with many disagreements. They argued about the cooperation of the 
Metropolitan Streetcar Company,38 when it was appropriate to remove the bans,39 and how 
accurate Dr. Gannon was at keeping the records.40
                                                          
36 "Dally with an Epidemic." 
 Disagreements between the two top health 
officials, played out in the press, did not present a reassuring face to the public that was 
confronting an epidemic. Eventually, Dr. Bullock gained the upper hand and Dr. Gannon was fired, 
37 Larsen, Hulston, and University of Missouri Press., 57. 
38 "Block Car Crowd Order." 
39 "Mayor Will Lift Ban." 
40 "Extra Hospital Is Ready." 
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but it would be hard to argue that he really did anything wrong. Given the state of medical 
knowledge about the flu, arguments could be made on both sides of almost any action.  
Dr. Bullock’s role in the on again, off again restrictions would seem to warrant an 
examination. He seemed to be torn between making a decision favoring public health and a 
decision favoring the political climate. He accepted a restriction on crowds (but only after the 
Chamber of Commerce suggested it),41 then a few days later, without any real change in the 
situation, he advocated a removal of those same restrictions.42  It was not until influenza occurred 
in his own family, on 30 October, that he became a strong supporter of the restrictions.43
Another incident to examine was when the Mayor abruptly removed all restrictions on 8 
November.
  
44  Dr. Bullock was admitted to the hospital with influenza on 31 October,45 and his 
daughter was critically ill from complications of influenza.46 Dr. Bullock never responded to the 
Mayor’s accusation of “incompetence”47on 8 November; it was possible that Dr. Bullock was still 
recuperating. When Dr. Bullock returned to the news on 14 November, he offered support for Mr. 
Motley’s and Mayor Cowgill’s decision to lift the only remaining restriction on the streetcars.48
                                                          
41 "Mr. Parsons Got Quick Action." 
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42 "Epidemic Is Checked." 
43 "Seek to Tilt Grip Lid." 
44 "Mayor Will Lift Ban." 
45 "No Move to Lift the Ban." 
46 "Won't Consider Lifting Ban." 
47 "Mayor Will Lift Ban." 
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the rest of the epidemic, Dr. Bullock focused on children under sixteen and the schools.49 Why had 
he encouraged a ban on 17 October,50 argued passionately for a retaining a closing order citing 
personal reasons,51
There was one decision that Dr. Bullock made that clearly had political overtones, however. 
After he returned from the public health conference in Chicago he was given an opportunity to 
begin to develop serum for influenza in Kansas City. He declined, citing costs. While it is true that 
later he stated that he was not sure of the effectiveness of the serum, given that he has nothing 
better to offer, would it not have been the wise public health course to try? Money was mentioned 
over and over as reason that the Health Board could not do something; they did not have cars to 
visit patients and inspect quarantines, doctors at General Hospital threatened to quit because the 
equipment or supplies were not available, and staff were not allowed to attend conferences due to 
lack of money. 
 and then just two weeks later agree with arguments for the removal of any 
restrictions? His change of opinion seemed to be the exception in my argument for political 
motivations. Given the political situation, agreement with the Mayor was the smart thing to do, but 
it was also true medical arguments could be made for the removal. A third possibility was that Dr. 
Bullock was simply worn out. He has been dealing with this epidemic for almost two months; he 
personally had the flu, as had members of his family, and as Health Director a great deal of 
responsibility would have been placed on him. 
                                                          
49 "Schools to Stay Closed." 
50 "Renew Fight on Disease." 
51 "Epidemic Is Checked." 
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In the final wave of the flu during the spring of 1919, Dr. Bullock seemed to feel that 
warnings to the public and announcements of improvement were as active as he needed to be. But 
in fact, there was really nothing left that he could do. Restrictions on businesses were not going to 
be supported by the Mayor, and even Dr. Wilkes from the Surgeon General offered no actions. 
There was disagreement among doctors on the effectiveness of quarantine. As we have already 
noted the Surgeon General believed it to be impracticable. But in 2007, a group of researchers from 
the National Institutes of Health and the Harvard School of Public Health analyzed the effectiveness 
of quarantine and other social distancing measures in 1918 on the excess death rate.52 The excess 
death rate is the number of deaths per 100,000 people above what would be normal for a period. 
The example that is easiest to understand is the contrast between Philadelphia and St. Louis. 
Philadelphia had the first cases on 17 September and imposed no restrictions until 3 October. They 
had an excess death rate of 719/100,000. St. Louis experienced the first cases on 5 October, and 
imposed restrictions on 7 October. Their excess death rate was 347/100,000.53
The next public figure in the influenza outbreak that bears examination was W. P. Motley. 
As President of the Health Board he should have had an active role in attempting to protect citizens 
 The Surgeon 
General was correct in his assessment of the impracticality of quarantine; Kansas City was a perfect 
example of how difficult it was to implement effectively. But St. Louis was proof that it was possible 
to significantly reduce the number of deaths if you could implement quarantine. 
                                                          
52 R. J. Hatchett and others, "Public Health Interventions and Epidemic Intensity During the 1918 Influenza 
Pandemic," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104, no. 18 
(2007). 
53 Ibid. 
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from the disease. Instead, Mr. Motley took very seriously his duty to protect business, especially 
theater owners, from any financial losses. Time and again, when the choice was public health or 
business, Mr. Motley sided with business. He protected the streetcars from Dr. Gannon,54 he 
protested Dr. Bullock’s decision, after consultation with other doctors, to continue a ban on 11 
October,55 he argued with the actions of the Board of Education,56 and he participated prominently 
in banned meetings with the theater owners held to overturn the measures medical experts were 
recommending.57
It was very hard to analyze Dr. Gannon’s actions. He was clearly not afraid to speak truth to 
power; as evidenced by his actions on 8 October at the beginning of the epidemic in his dealings 
with Dr. Bullock and Mr. Motley,
 Mr. Motley had no medical background, so why did he feel qualified to judge the 
measures they proposed? He had the support of the Mayor, and given the prominence of his 
appointed position, he was probably well acquainted with the Democratic machine in Kansas City. 
Perhaps he felt that his loyalty was to them, not to the citizens. Whatever his reasons, Mr. Motley 
had a negative role in the fight to prevent deaths in Kansas City.  
58 and when he supported retaining a ban on 11 October.59
                                                          
54 "Block Car Crowd Order." 
 
However when the Mayor removed all restrictions on 14 November, Dr. Gannon supported that 
action. It was possible that he simply felt the restrictions had accomplished what they were 
55 "Continue Ban on Crowds." 
56 "Fuss over School Opening." 
57 "Theater Men in Line." 
58 "Block Car Crowd Order." 
59 "Continue Ban on Crowds." 
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intended to do, and there was really no need to continue them any further. He might also have felt 
vindicated in his efforts with the Metropolitan Streetcar Company earlier in the epidemic, since the 
Mayor cited the inability of the Health Department to control the streetcars as the reason other 
stores had been closed. Dr. Gannon issued no statement regarding his firing on 27 November,60 and 
returned to his private practice. He was heard from again in March of 1919, offering support to Dr. 
Carl A. Nylund, who was fired from his position as attending physician at the Leeds Tuberculosis 
Hospital after he had made charges of terrible conditions there.61
The most telling evidence concerning political pressure on the political appointees was 
evidenced by the lack of members remaining on the Board at the end of the epidemic. Mr. Motley 
wanted to resign, but remained, only because the Mayor requested it.
 
62 Dr. Bullock resigned as 
head of General Hospital, citing his health and the current epidemic,63 but remained as Health 
Director. Dr. Gannon was fired and replaced by Dr. Maclay Lyon, but he was only half time in that 
position as he remained head of school medical inspections. The lone Republican member of the 
Board, H. L. Benjamin, resigned on 30 November, citing political pressure.64 Mayor Cowgill named a 
personal friend, Dr. A.W. Thompson, to replace Dr. Bullock at General Hospital,65
                                                          
60 "Hold Secret Health Meeting." 
 but he was also a 
half time position. It could not have been easy managing a public health epidemic while at the same 
61 "Say Charges Are True," Kansas City Star, 3 March 1919. 
62 "Hope When U.S. Steps In." 
63 "Call U.S. On Influenza." 
64 "Hold Secret Health Meeting." 
65 "U.S. Aid in Epidemic Soon." 
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time making sure that you did not alienate your political bosses. That might explain why there were 
only three original members left, and one of those did not want the position. 
As final evidence of political pressure I would like to examine events as they occurred on 
both sides of the state line. While it was clear that Kansas City, Kansas was not immune to pressure 
from business, it is also clear that there was a great deal of cooperation and some very innovative 
ways of handling the shortage of personnel. It was a unique solution to have ministers volunteering 
and being deputized as health officials.66
It would have been the ultimate proof of the effectiveness of measures on both sides of the 
state line to locate statistics for both cities. There are statistics, but they do not measure the same 
thing. Kansas City had a mortality rate of 719/100,000
 And in contrast to Missouri where the Health Department 
was expected to deal with this crisis without any additional funds, in Kansas, city departments 
raised money to assist in the effort to contain the crisis. Official actions on both sides of the state 
line are detailed in appendix g. What was most striking was the number of times that Missouri 
started or stopped an intervention, in contrast to Kansas where the restrictions lasted a fairly long 
time.  
67 for what was called the influenza pandemic 
but in Kansas City, Kansas the statistics were separated for influenza and pneumonia. Influenza 
statistics were 281.9/100,000, and for pneumonia it was 540.2/100,000.68
                                                          
66 "Ministers in Grip Fight." 
 Unfortunately, that 
makes it difficult to compare the two towns. Presumably, in Missouri, that statistic included all 
67 Thomas A. Garrett, "Pandemic Economics: The 1918 Influenza and Its Modern-Day Implications," Review 
(00149187) 90, no. 2 (2008). 
68 State of Kansas, Tenth Biennial Report1920, Vol. 35 and 36, pt. 30 June 1918 to 1 July 1920, 291. 
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deaths that were related to influenza, including those deaths from pneumonia following the flu, 
although that is not really clear. However, 719/100,000 is the standard figure that is cited for 
Kansas City, Missouri in most studies.69 If the two figures for influenza and pneumonia in Kansas are 
added together, it would be 822.1/100,000, but that number does not account for the duplication 
of cases in which the patient had both influenza and pneumonia. Additionally, there is no 
explanation of how it was determined if a patient died of influenza or pneumonia. So that leaves us 
only able to compare actual deaths. Kansas City Kansas had 776 deaths from both pneumonia and 
influenza in 1918, and another 271 deaths for those causes in 1919,70 for a total of 1047 deaths. 
The population of Kansas City Kansas was 96,463 in 1919. In Missouri, the number of influenza 
deaths through 15 April, 1919 was 1271 and for pneumonia was 1066, for a total of 2337,71
In conclusion, the influenza pandemic in 1918 Kansas City will be remembered as a classic 
example of what happens when public health officials are beholden to political leaders. If Dr. 
Bullock had not been so concerned about the security of his position, he might have been able to 
 but the 
population was more than three times bigger. On the surface it seems as if Missouri did not do that 
badly, but once again the statistics measure different periods. For Kansas the numbers are for all of 
1918 and 1919, but in Missouri the numbers are only 1918 and through April of 1919. Other factors 
to be considered are the true population statistics. Kansas City, Kansas, was an area of immigrants, 
with many people from Mexico, and populations like this are historically undercounted. 
                                                          
69 Bootsma and Ferguson; Garrett. 
70 Kansas, 293. 
71 Board, 22. 
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look at the situation solely as a physician. Instead, he was forced to consider the political fallout of 
every public health decision that he made, and this created the dysfunctional response in Kansas 
City, Missouri. In Kansas City, Kansas, the public health leaders and the politicians cooperated on 
the response, but even then the city health director, Dr. C. W. McLaughlin, ended up losing his job. 
Was he truly incompetent? We may never know, but unlike Dr. Gannon, he at least got a public 
hearing of the charges against him.
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APPENDIX A 
PERSONS OF INTEREST 
Missouri side 
 Hobbs, A. A., Captain- Army Motor School 
Thompson, A. W., DR-successor to Dr. Bullock as head of General Hospital 
Gannon, A.J., DR-Head of Contagious Diseases 
Parsons, Bernard A.- President of the Missouri Chamber of Commerce 
Hart, B.L. -Vice-President of the Health Board 
Sandy, C., DR-City Physician 
Bullock, E. H., DR-Health Director and Head of General Hospital 
Benjamin, Harry -Republican member of the Health Board 
Cartinsky, Harry, DR-Theater interests’ representative  
Cammack, I. I., - Superintendent of Schools 
Jackson, Jabez, DR-Red Cross 
Cowgill, James - Mayor, Democrat 
Shannon, Joe -Democratic boss of the Rabbits 
Lyon, Maclay, DR-supervisor of medical inspection for schools and replacement for Dr. 
Gannon 
Dutton, Dell, Major-head of the Red Cross 
Mather, Mrs. Harry- head of the Red Cross nurses 
Kealy, P.J., -owner of the Metropolitan Railway Company, Democrat 
Blue, Rupert, DR-Surgeon General of the US 
Godley, Scott, chief of Police 
Pendergast, Tom -Democratic boss of the Goats 
Motley, W. P. -President of the Health Board 
Kansas Side 
McLaughlin, C.W., DR- Health Officer 
Mendenhall, H.A., Mayor 
Dean, H.E. -moving pictures representative 
Shelton, Charles D., Lieutenant, DR-State Public Health Officer 
Pearson, M.E. -Superintendent of the Public Schools 
Higgins, R.J. -Street Railway representative 
 Chapman, L.H. -Commissioner of Light and Water Department 
 Little, G.B. -Commissioner of Finance 
 Appleby, Clyde Leigh, DR-successor to Lt. Shelton 
Crumbine, J. S. -Secretary of the Kansas State Board of Health 
Moulder, M. L. -head of Bethany Hospital 
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Brown,  J.B. -Commissioner of City Parks and Health
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APPENDIX B 
MAYOR’S PROCLAMATION1
It has come to my knowledge and I hereby proclaim that a malignant, infectious and 
contagious disease, commonly known as Spanish influenza, is prevalent in Kansas City, and the 
health board is hereby empowered and instructed to take all steps and use all measures necessary, 
to avoid, suppress and mitigate such disease, and to employ such officers, agents, servants and 
assistants, establish such hospitals, provide necessary furniture, medical attendance, nurses, food, 
clothing, shelter and relief as in the opinion of the said board, may be necessary and advisable. But 
the amount expended shall not exceed any appropriation made for the health department. All 
persons, firms and corporations in Kansas City, Mo., are hereby requested and ordered to comply 
with all reasonable orders of the health board for the avoidance, suppression and mitigation of 
such disease. 
 
Dated at Kansas City, Mo., this October 17, 1918
                                                          
1 "New Kansas Side Health Head." 
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APPENDIX C 
HEALTH BOARD REGULATIONS1
WHEREAS,  The mayor of Kansas City has this day issued proclamation, proclaiming that a 
malignant and contagious disease commonly known as Spanish influenza, is prevalent in 
Kansas City, and the health board is recommended by him to take all steps and use all 
measures to avoid, suppress and mitigate such disease, and to employ such officers, 
agents, servants and assistants and establish such hospitals, etc., as in the opinion of the 
said board may be necessary and advisable: 
 Now, therefore be it resolved by the health board as follows: 
 All schools, public, private, parochial, sectarian, and nonsectarian, all churches, 
church services, Sunday schools and prayer meetings, all theaters, moving pictures shows 
and all other places of public gathering, consisting of twenty (20) or more persons, must be 
closed, except such meetings as may be considered of military necessity. 
 The doors of all public telephone booths must be kept open at all times and the 
booth and mouthpiece used for transmission must be sterilized at least twice daily. The 
windows of all street cars, motor muses and vehicles wherein people are conveyed must be 
kept open, except to exclude rain, and all such conveyances must be kept clean and 
thoroughly sterilized daily. All elevators used by the general public in stores, office 
buildings, depots and public buildings must be sterilized daily. Crowding of elevators is 
prohibited.  
           Stores having twenty-five (25) employees, or more, shall open at 9 a. m. and close at 
4 p. m. Crowding must not be permitted in any store, regardless of size.  
 All music and all other amusements in hotels, restaurants and cabarets must be 
dispensed with. 
 The regulations hereinafter mentioned and formulated by the committee of the 
staff of the General Hospital are made a part of this order, except that a number not 
exceeding fifteen (15) or twenty (20) people are not to be allowed standing in the 
streetcars. 
                                                                              REGULATIONS 
 We recommend the closing of all schools, churches, theaters and picture shows, 
and all public gatherings not essential to the carrying on of governmental work, be 
immediately prohibited. 
 We recommend that the street cars only allow sufficient people to ride to fill the 
seats, none standing, windows open, cars kept clean and spitting ordinance rigidly 
 
                                                          
1 "Mayor Replaces Ban in Effort to Check Influenza," Kansas City Journal, 18 October 1918. 
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enforced. We recommend that any house where there is influenza or pneumonia of any 
type, including the common cold, that a strict quarantine of the patient be maintained; that 
a placard be put up there and the patient not allowed out until that patient has been 
pronounced cured by an efficient quarantine officer. 
 Under present conditions it is recommended that the healthy members of the 
family be permitted to go out. 
 We recommend that every one of the above mentioned cases must be reported 
immediately, under penalty, by the attending physician, to the health board. 
 We recommend that the health board appoint a sufficient number of quarantine 
officers, and we recommend that with the consent of the board of education that the 
teachers be employed as quarantine officers, whose duty it shall be to ascertain if the 
patient is free from all catarrhal symptoms, coughing, sneezing, etc., before that patient is 
release from quarantine; the nurse to make at least one visit to the family during the period 
of illness and instruct the family—not only the sick member, but the healthy members, 
what preventive measures to use. 
     We recommend that a scientific committee be appointed, to meet regularly, at definite 
stated intervals, to co-operate with the health board. 
       It is recommended that through the newspapers and printed circulars, the public be 
regularly instructed as to the nature of the disease and active preventive measures that are 
officially represented by the health department. 
     This order is to be effective immediately, and publication of this order in the daily 
newspapers of Kansas City shall be deemed sufficient notice of the same.
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APPENDIX D 
GENERAL HOSPITAL INFLUENZA PAMPHLET1
General rules for the prevention of influenza and its spread, as outlined by the staff 
physicians of the General Hospital: 
 
Influenza resembles a vey contagious “cold,” accompanied by fever, pains in the head, 
eyes, ears, back or other parts of the body and a feeling of severe sickness. 
 There may be an absence of nose and throat symptoms, with no sneezing or coughing. 
Fever alone may be the only symptom other than a general tired feeling. 
               There is no way in which a single case of influenza can be recognized. Therefore, any case 
resembling a cold should be looked upon with suspicion. Recognition is easy where there are a 
group of cases. 
 The disease is spread by direct contact. People affected with the disease, however slight, 
will transmit it to others by sneezing, coughing or expectorating in close proximity to other people. 
Persons having a slight attack and going about will infect other people who will have the severest 
and most dangerous form. 
 The disease is more dangerous than smallpox, diphtheria or scarlet fever. 
How To Prevent Influenza 
               Avoid all crowds. 
               Avoid dust. It carries germs in dry form. 
               Keep bowels active by laxatives. 
               Keep kidneys active by drinking plenty of water. 
               Bathe frequently. Strict cleanliness in every respect about person and home should be 
observed. 
               Keep the body strong by eating moderately of wholesome, well cooked food. Eat plenty of 
vegetables, fruits, cereals, milk and eggs. Meats in moderate quantity. Eat regularly. Work regularly. 
Sleep regularly. 
               Keep the body well clothed according to weather conditions. 
              Keep houses, shops and all places where people stay well ventilated. Do not allow houses to 
become cold or damp. Keep fires sufficient to insure comfortable temperature. 
              Always sneeze in a handkerchief. Cough in a handkerchief. If you must spit, use a 
handkerchief, not the sidewalk or street. 
              Some people are carriers who do not feel sick. 
              A teaspoon of salt in a point of boiled water used hot is an excellent gargle to be used night 
and morning. The same solution makes a good nose douche. In using this solution in the nose be 
careful not to blow the nose forcibly afterward. A safe way to wash out the nose is by means of a 
fountain syringe held slightly above the head, allowing the water to flow into one nostril and out 
the other. Keep the mouth open and head bent slightly forward, breathing through the mouth. Use 
                                                          
1 "Epidemic Fight Goes On." 
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a quart of the solution night and morning. 
              There is no specific treatment for influenza. When sick, call a doctor. Follow his directions. 
To expose yourself while sick may cost you your life, or you may infect others and cost them their 
lives. 
              Follow your physician’s instructions until you are release by his orders. 
              Common baking soda taken in water, under a physician’s direction, has been reported to 
have been beneficial in some cases. It is said to have been a preventive in some instances.  
              Every person should help control the disease by controlling their own actions and assisting 
in every way to prevent the spreading of the disease. 
 
                     A. J. Lorie, M. D. 
                     P. T. Bohan, M. D.  
                     Scott P. Child, M. D. 
Committee of General Hospital Staff, Kansas City, Mo. 
E. H. Bullock, M. D., 
        General Superintendent and Health Director 
                                                                  _________________ 
 Eye, ear, nose and throat specialists suggested the use of gauze masks as a preventive 
measure, stating it was the only dependable preventive known.
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APPENDIX E 
TELEGRAM TO THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT1
 
 
Assistance is needed at once from your department to help control the influenza epidemic in 
Kansas City. May we hope for immediate response? 
 Cases Deaths 
November 23 55 6 
November 24 45 8 
November 25 157 7 
November 26 204 14 
November 27 314 7 
November 28 170 8 
November 29 414 12 
November 30 345 6 
December 1 185 12 
December 2 401 16 
December 3 395 20 
December 4 345 16 
                                                          
1 "Call U.S. On Influenza." 
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APPENDIX F 
MAJOR BAHRENBURG’S RECOMMENDATIONS1
Moving picture shows and theaters to be closed unless strictly observing regulations of health 
authorities under permit. 
 
Strict quarantine of homes and prosecution for those who attempt to evade quarantine. 
Ventilation of street cars with inspectors stationed at barns to see that all cars are placed in 
operation. 
Ejection from picture shows and theaters of all persons coughing or sneezing. 
Boys and girls under 16 years of age to be barred from theaters and public meetings of all kinds. 
Campaign of education in regard to prevention and treatment of disease.
                                                          
1 "Federal Agent Is Here." 
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APPENDIX G 
PUBLIC HEALTH RESTRICTIONS 
  
Date Kansas City, Missouri Kansas City, Kansas 
27 September, 1918 First case of influenza First case sometime the 
first week of October 
7 October, 1918 Public ban on gatherings of 
more than 20 people 
 
8 October, 1918 Public schools closed  
9 October, 1918  Schools closed and all 
public gatherings 
banned 
14 October, 1918 Ban on gathering of more than 
20 persons removed 
 
15 October, 1918 Mayor admits ban was not 
effective 
 
17 October, 1918 A stricter ban is issued, no public 
gatherings, war work remains 
exempt 
 
8 November, 1918 Mayor lifts ban, except on 
streetcars 
 
 
11 November, 1918  Schools reopen 
14 November, 1918 Mayor removes all restrictions, 
requests no extreme crowding 
 
18 November, 1918 Public schools reopen  
27 November, 1918 Dr. Gannon fired  
30 November, 1918 Public schools closed again  
3 December, 1918  Schools closed and ban 
on children younger 
than 16 in stores or 
theaters 
5 December, 1918 Mayor asks for federal help  
11 December, 1918 Federal doctor arrives  
13 December, 1918 Ban on children younger than 16 
in stores or theaters 
 
16 December, 1918 Ban on loitering and 
congregating 
 
18 December, 1918 Federal doctor leaves  
23 December, 1918 All restrictions are ended All restriction are ended 
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APPENDIX H 
GREATER KANSAS CITY HOSPITALS IN 19181
 
 
Baptist Hospital, 7th and Bennington 
 
Bell Memorial Hospital, Rosedale, KS 
 
Bethany Hospital, 12th and Reynolds, KS 
 
Christian Church Hospital, Paseo and 27th 
 
City (General) Hospital, 27th and Cherry 
 
East Side Hospital, 920 Newton 
 
Grace Hospital, 9th NW cor Harrison 
 
Kansas City Provident Assn, 1115 Charlotte 
 
Mercy Hospital, Independence Blvd 
 
Missouri Pacific Hospital, 706 w 10th 
 
Research Hospital, Holmes and 23rd 
 
St. Joseph’s Hospital, Prospect, 31st and Linwood 
 
St. Luke’s Hospital, 2011 E 11th 
 
St. Margaret’s Hospital, 8th Vermont and Harrison, KS 
 
St. Mary’s Hospital, 2800 Main 
 
South Side Hospital, 3007 Main 
 
Swedish Hospital, 3003 Wyandotte 
 
Swope Settlement, 1608 Campbell 
 
                                                          
1 "Kansas City Social Register : A Blue Book." 
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University Hospital, Campbell SE cor 10th 
 
Wesley Hospital, 11th NW cor Harrison
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